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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Auditor and Underwriter Industry Specialization/Differentiation: Evidence from IPO 
Underpricing and Long-term Performance. (August 2005) 
Kun Wang, B.A., Shanxi University of Finance & Economics; 
M.A., Beijing Technology and Business University; 
M.S., New Mexico State University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Michael Wilkins 
 
 
The dissertation examines IPO underpricing and long-term performance to assess 
the use of industry specialization as a differentiation strategy by audit firms and 
underwriters. Prior studies indicate that prestigious auditors or underwriters (e.g., Big 6 
auditors) are associated with IPO underpricing. I extend existing literature by 
incorporating market share as a refined measure of auditor (underwriter) reputation.  In 
particular, I define a differentiated auditor (underwriter) as the market leader that 
possesses significantly higher market share than their competitors in the client industry. I 
hypothesize that the impact of auditor (underwriter) reputation in the IPO setting 
depends on whether the audit firm (underwriter) has successfully differentiated itself 
from competitors within client industries. My results show that as audit firm 
(underwriter) industry market share increases without differentiation, the IPO 
underpricing increases. It appears that this group of auditors (underwriters) intentionally 
engages in high-risk IPOs in order to gain fee advantages. In contrast, differentiated 
auditors (underwriters) are related to lower IPO underpricing because their reputation 
        
 
iv
assist in reducing information asymmetry between issuers and investors.  My study is 
important because it shows that the benefits previously thought to be attributable to a 
very large set of auditors and underwriters stems primary – and perhaps exclusively – 
from those dominate their respective industries. This project also provides a benefit to 
firms that are considering public offerings since they need to evaluate the cost and 
benefit of selecting industry-dominant auditors and underwriters. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the most heavily investigated areas of research in the IPO literature 
involves the persistent underpricing of equity securities (e.g., Ibbotson 1975; Ritter 
1984; Longhran and Ritter 2002).1,2 In this context, the term “underpricing” is used to 
describe the difference between the offering price and the market-clearing price at 
issuance. Although a number of papers have attempted to identify factors that are 
responsible for the underpricing phenomenon, relatively little attention has been paid to 
the expertise of the auditors and underwriters that are appointed for the new issues. More 
specifically, the literature to date has done nothing more than associates underpricing 
with crude proxies for auditor and underwriter quality (“high” versus “low”). Although 
some links do appear to exist (e.g., Balvers et al. 1988; Beatty 1989; Hogan 1997; 
Willenborg 1999), the measures used in these studies are too broad (and in some cases 
insufficient) to completely capture the nature of the observed relationships. The primary 
purpose of this dissertation is to investigate these issues more thoroughly using recent 
methodological improvements from the audit fee literature. 
This study provides initial evidence on several questions relating to the IPO 
underpricing and long-term performance. First, I investigate whether auditor industry 
specialization is associated with underpricing and underwriting costs of new issues. A 
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style and format of The Accounting Review. 
1  For a review of the literature on the IPO market, see Ritter and Welch (2002). 
2 Underpricing translates directly into the initial return, defined as the return earned by an investor buying 
at the offering price and selling at the first-day closing price. These terms – underpricing and initial return 
– are used interchangeably in the literature. 
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common problem with extant underpricing studies is that they consistently define audit 
quality in terms of the Big 4/5/6 and non-Big 4/5/6 classification. While this scheme is 
consistent with a number of general theories of auditor selection (DeAngelo 1981; 
Simunic and Stein 1987), the definition is broad and fails to fully capture the dynamics 
of audit quality. In fact, Healy and Lys (1986) suggest that auditor size and audit quality 
are not necessarily related. They further emphasize that large audit firms can be 
differentiated through the specialized services that they can provide to clients (e.g., SEC 
reporting in their cases).  
In support of Healy and Lys’ propositions, Mayhew and Wilkins (2003) find that 
the impact of auditor quality on auditor compensation is subtler than what is documented 
in studies employing the simple Big 6 and non-Big 6 classification in the IPO setting. 
Audit firms with large market shares are able to develop more industry-specific 
knowledge and expertise, thereby enabling them to provide higher quality services than 
similar audit firms with smaller market shares. Specifically, Mayhew and Wilkins (2003) 
show that a fee premium exists only among “differentiated” auditors – that is, the subset 
of Big 6 audit firms that have a clear lead over their competitors in light of industry 
market share. The authors do not address the association between auditor industry 
specialization and IPO underpricing and underwriting costs. To the extent that 
specialized auditors do provide additional value-added service beyond what has been 
attributed previously to “Big 6 quality”, I hypothesize that both underpricing and 
underwriting fees will be lower for issues audited by differentiated audit firms.  
3 
 
 
The present study also provides evidence on whether industry specialization 
among underwriters affects underpricing and underwriting costs. Prior studies establish 
that prestigious underwriters increase the net IPO proceeds received by an issuer (i.e., 
minimizing underpricing) either directly by certifying a higher firm value or indirectly 
by reducing the required underpricing for investor participation (Carter and Manaster 
1990).3 On the other hand, Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) find that by spending time 
acquiring industry-specific knowledge, an industry specialist underwriter – much like an 
audit firm – is better equipped to price IPOs accurately. Implicit in their argument is the 
notion that industry specialization assists underwriters in achieving higher service 
quality. As a consequence, issues underwritten by industry specialist underwriters should 
have less underpricing. However, this relation has not yet been empirically tested in the 
academic literature. Moreover, the relationship between underwriting costs and 
underwriter industry specialization remains a completely open question. If the evidence 
documented by Mayhew and Wilkins (2003) regarding audit fees is analogized to 
underwriting costs, underwriting fees should be decreasing with the increase of 
underwriter market share due to economies of scale. But this pattern should reverse for 
underwriters that successfully differentiate themselves from their competitors in the 
industry. Both of these questions will be addressed in this dissertation. 
Further, my study presents evidence on the relationship between auditors and 
underwriters in the context of industry specialization. Menon and Williams (1991) 
                                                 
3 Underwriter reputation is normally defined by the ranking of underwriters (i.e., top 18 or top 25). Similar 
to the classification of auditor reputation, there is speculation that this definition needs to be refined. 
Introducing additional metrics of underwriter quality, such as industry specialization, can provide new 
insights on the effects of underwriter quality (Chen and Ritter 2000). 
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demonstrate that underwriters exert considerable influence on an IPO firm’s auditor-
hiring decision. As industry specialization further differentiates audit quality across Big 
4/5/6 firms, it is reasonable to expect that bundling industry specialized auditors and 
underwriters together would be an effective strategy in maximizing IPO proceeds. 
Balvers et al. (1988) document that the collective effect of bundling high reputation 
auditors and underwriters is positive (i.e., more underpricing). However, their reputation 
proxies are suboptimal, the concept of specialization and differentiation is not introduced 
at all, and a number of institutional changes have occurred (both with respect to audit 
firms and the IPO market) since the end of their sample period. The present study, by 
updating the time horizon and refining the relevant measures, attempts to more 
adequately assess the relationship between underpricing and the bundling of specialist 
auditors and underwriters.  
Finally, I provide evidence on the association between auditor (underwriter) 
industry specialization and long-run IPO performance. Several studies (Jain and Kini 
1994; Mikkleson et al. 1997) attempt to find firm characteristics that result in cross-
sectional predictability of long-term IPO performance. Drawing on monitoring theory, I 
hypothesize that firms retaining industry specialized auditors and underwriters are, 
ceteris paribus, of higher quality than other firms and are also likely to have better 
monitoring mechanisms in place. Such monitoring should reduce agency costs and 
improve long-run performance of the offering firms. 
My tests are based on a sample of 2,234 domestic IPOs brought to market 
between 1991 and 2001. Previous research confirms that the IPO market generates high 
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levels of competition for both auditors and underwriters. This high level of competition 
enables me to conduct a powerful test of the hypotheses. Following Hogan and Jeter 
(1999), and Mayhew and Wilkins (2003), I define auditor (underwriter) industry 
specialization in terms of the audit firm’s (underwriter’s) concentration levels in two-
digit SIC codes based upon the industry proportion of the square root of assets 
(proceeds) audited (underwritten). Additionally, an auditor (underwriter) is defined as 
“differentiated” if it has the largest market share in any particular two-digit SIC code per 
IPO-year and its market share is at least ten percentage points higher than its closest 
competitors.  
The empirical tests are run in three stages. First, an underpricing model using the 
entire sample of IPOs is used to replicate previous findings that general auditor 
reputation, as proxied by Big 4/5/6 and non-Big 4/5/6, suppresses IPO underpricing.  
Second, I constrain the tests to IPOs associated with Big 4/5/6 auditors, and use OLS to 
analyze the effects of auditor and underwriter industry specialization on underpricing, 
audit fees, and underwriting fees, as well as IPO long-term performance. Finally, to 
control for both the supply-side and the demand-side effects of auditor reputation, I use 
simultaneous equations to re-estimate the underpricing and audit fee models. The 
regression models employ control variables identified by recent IPO studies, modified 
by dynamics that are likely to influence the association among issuers, underwriters, and 
auditors.  
As hypothesized, I find that IPO underpricing is reduced by 5 (6) percent if an 
auditor (underwriter) is identified as an industry differentiated specialist. This result is 
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important because it confirms that the auditing and underwriting market are quality 
differentiated regarding industry expertise. Companies can leverage on the quality of 
auditors and/or underwriters to reduce the underpricing. I also find that the impact of 
auditor and underwriter industry specialization (differentiation) on underwriter 
compensation is sensitive to the size of the IPO firms. Smaller IPOs tend to pay more 
fees to high reputation underwriters, but selecting a differentiated auditor may reduce the 
cost of these firms paid to underwriters. Further, the results indicate that industry 
specialists underwriters, rather than auditors, are more likely to be associated with 
improved long-term performance of IPOs.  
My study makes significant contributions to the IPO literature because it is the 
first in either accounting or finance to address whether IPO underpricing and long-run 
performance are impacted by auditor and underwriter industry specialization. By 
providing substantial refinements in the definitions of audit and underwriter “quality” or 
“reputation”, this study should remedy a number of the deficiencies that currently exist 
in the literature. This paper also has implications for auditing and underwriting 
practitioners by highlighting the potential benefits (higher fees and better IPO pricing) 
that stem from industry specialization. Finally, entrepreneurs considering public 
offerings should find this research of interest as they evaluate the costs and benefits 
associated with hiring industry specialists. 
This paper will be structured as follows. First, an overview of the audit and 
underwriting functions in an IPO is given in Section II. Section III develops research 
questions and relevant hypotheses based upon extant auditing and finance literature. This 
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is followed by a description of the proposed research method in Section IV. Upon 
completion of the study, empirical results will follow as well as a comment section. 
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II. THE IPO SETTING AND HYPOTHESES 
 
IPO Underpricing 
The underpricing of IPOs has been a topic of theoretical and empirical 
investigation for decades. Recently, this topic has enjoyed a resurgence of interest, 
motivated by the astonishingly high first-day returns on IPOs during the Internet bubble 
period of the late 90s. Based upon the extent of underpricing (15% to 65% in “hot issue” 
markets) documented in numerous empirical studies (e.g., Ibbotson 1975; Ritter 1984), 
Ritter and Welch (2002) contend that underpricing is a persistent feature of the IPO 
market and, while cyclical, may have increased in magnitude over time. Why do 
investment bankers underprice IPOs? Are there certain types of underwriters or certain 
characteristics of issues that are more (or less) likely to be associated with underpricing? 
Explanations for the underpricing phenomenon frequently rely on the adverse 
selection consequences of information asymmetry. An agency-based model offered by 
Baron (1982) is built on the premise that the underwriter has significantly better 
information than the issuing firm concerning the demand for the issuer’s securities. To 
induce the underwriter to put in the requisite effort to market shares, it is optimal to 
permit some underpricing, because the issuer cannot monitor the underwriter without 
incurring some costs. A follow-up study by Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989), 
however, reports that when underwriters themselves go public, their shares are just as 
underpriced even though there is no monitoring problem.  
An alternative relationship between uncertainty and underpricing is suggested by 
Beatty and Ritter (1986) and Rock (1986). In their models, two classes of investors are 
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assumed. Informed investors, on one hand, always bid for securities that are underpriced. 
On the other hand, relatively uninformed investors are aware of the possibility that they 
would tend to receive a greater portion of the overpriced issues than the informed 
investors would. Thus, in order to induce uninformed investors to participate in the IPO 
market, IPOs must be sufficiently underpriced to allow uninformed investors a 
reasonable return for the ex ante uncertainty and to enable them to cover the losses 
resulting from purchasing overpriced securities.  
Bookbuilding models also agree with the view that informed investors are more 
privileged than uninformed investors in gathering information about IPOs. But 
underpricing is not interpreted as a form of compensation to uninformed investors to 
participate in market. Rather, issuers underprice to encourage informed investors to 
reveal their high personal demand for shares (e.g., in the road shows). Similarly, Lee et 
al. (1999) present evidence that informed investors request more, and preferentially 
receive more, IPO share allocations.  
Theories of IPO underpricing based on information asymmetries have been met 
with partial acceptance by financial economists, as well as refutations arguing that these 
theories are unlikely to explain the recent average first-day returns of 65 percent earned 
in the Internet bubble period. There are also theories of underpricing that do not hinge on 
asymmetric information that is resolved on the first day of trading. Tinic (1988) argues 
that underpricing serves as a form of insurance against legal liability and the associated 
damages to the reputation of investment bankers. Ritter and Welch (2002) cast doubt on 
10 
 
 
his theory by questioning that leaving money on the table appears to be a cost-inefficient 
way of avoiding subsequent lawsuits.  
Boehmer and Fishe (2001) advance another explanation for underpricing. They 
note that the high trading volume in the aftermarket is associated with greater 
underpricing of IPOs. Thus an underwriter that makes a market in a Nasdaq-listed IPO 
gains additional trading revenue. Unlike the lawsuit-avoidance explanation of 
underpricing, it remains unclear how the issuer benefits from the underpricing in this 
context based upon Booth and Smith (1986), unless the increased liquidity is persistent. 
In sum, there are several possible explanations for the underpricing of IPOs. 
Although none of them taken alone has received overwhelming empirical support, the 
facts derived from these studies do suggest that (1) IPOs are significantly underpriced on 
average and (2) the more established an issuer and hence the less investor uncertainty 
about the firm’s real value, the lower the underpricing. The purpose of this dissertation is 
to examine the extent to which auditor and underwriter industry specialization help to 
resolve investor uncertainties and as such, decrease underpricing of IPO firms.  
Impact of Audit Quality on IPO Underpricing  
Audit Quality – General 
 
Practically speaking, the independent auditor’s role in the IPO process includes 
responsibility for auditing the financial statements and providing advice, as well as 
general services involving the resolution of accounting issues, due diligence procedures, 
and the review of registration statements. The auditor is also responsible for issuing 
comfort letters to the underwriter. With respect to the comfort letter, some of the duties 
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include attestation regarding condensed financial information and other data. The duties 
also include negative assurance as to whether certain financial information outside of the 
purview of financial statements complies in form and in all material respects with the 
securities regulations.  
In the accounting literature, there are four studies that document an association 
between the magnitudes of IPO underpricing and proxies for audit quality (e.g., Balvers 
et al. 1988; Beatty 1989; Hogan 1997; and Willenborg 1999). These associations are 
statistically significant and relatively robust but controversy surrounds their 
interpretation or meaning.  One view suggests that a high quality auditor is demanded in 
an IPO setting to reduce information asymmetry between owners and investors (i.e., the 
reputation hypothesis), thereby reducing the cost to the initial purchasers of securities. 
The reputation hypothesis is normally tested by regressing underpricing on an indicator 
variable (i.e., Big4/5/6 vs. non-Big4/5/6) for auditor quality along with other control 
variables. The coefficient on auditor quality is then interpreted as the average increase or 
decrease in underpricing from choosing a higher quality auditor (Balvers et al. 1988; 
Beatty 1989). However, this approach does not take into account that auditor selection is 
influenced by cost differences across auditor types. If Big 4/5/6 auditors charge a risk 
premium that is sufficiently higher than the risk premium charged by non-Big 4/5/6 
auditors, then the incremental cost of choosing a Big 4/5/6 auditor may outweigh the 
incremental benefit. The existence of both demand-side and supply-side effects of client-
specific risk implies that auditor choice depends on a trade-off of costs and benefits and 
that the audit quality/risk relations may be nonlinear.  
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In an attempt to correct the problem from the supply-side effect of risk, Beatty 
(1989) uses a two-stage least squares approach to establish a reputation proxy by 
regressing compensation paid to the audit firms on measures of audit intensity (i.e., IPO 
proceeds, client sales, and client equity). The extent of underpricing is then regressed on 
the residuals from the compensation regression to provide evidence of the reputation 
hypothesis. Results using this residual proxy confirm that clients that pay a premium for 
their IPO audit are subject to less underpricing.  
An alternative approach to control both demand-side and supply-side effects is 
demonstrated by Hogan (1997). Using self-selection analysis, she examines the trade-
offs that an entrepreneur makes in an IPO between the incremental costs and benefits of 
selecting a Big 6 audit firm. Self-selection analysis provides a method of accounting for 
the cost/benefit trade-off and examining the effect of client-specific risk separately in 
each audit quality group. Evidence drawn from a sample of IPOs during the early 1990s 
suggests that the benefit of hiring a Big 6 auditor is a reduction in the extent of 
underpricing, consistent with Beatty (1989), while the cost of hiring a Big 6 auditor is 
higher auditor compensation. Hogan’s overall findings are consistent with a 
differentiated market for audit services where owners select the level of audit quality – 
high or low – that minimizes the sum of underpricing and audit compensation costs. 
On the other hand, Willenborg (1999) attempts to interpret the ability of high 
quality auditors to reduce underpricing from an insurance signaling perspective. 
Underlying his arguments is the assumption that auditors are perceived as providing 
financial statement users with a form of insurance; the prestigious audit firms have been 
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shown to provide increased coverage in the event of securities litigation (Wallace 1987). 
In his empirical tests, Willenborg (1999) seeks to disentangle the information-based 
demand for auditing from insurance-based demand by partitioning IPOs into start-ups 
and established companies, per SFAS No. 7. For startups, he argues that the quality of the 
audit should be of less interest because the financial statements of a startup contain little 
meaningful accounting information. Alternatively, investors are more concerned with the 
insurance coverage auditors provide for a startup IPO rather than the information quality 
offered by auditors. Therefore, the insurance-based demand for auditing is likely to 
dominate any information-based demand for IPO audits. The expected negative relation 
between auditor reputation and underpricing, however, emerges in both the startups and 
the larger portion of established companies. Willenborg interprets these results as 
supporting both roles for auditing, though the evidence in support of an insurance 
signaling role seems particularly strong.  
Taken collectively, while it has been documented that large audit firms can 
potentially reduce IPO underpricing, the underlying theories offer competing 
predictions. One potential explanation for the inability of prior studies to differentiate 
between the competing predictions stems from their failure to distinguish between the 
service quality provided within Big 4/5/6 audit firms in an IPO context. Especially for 
the reputation hypothesis, the classification of Big 4/5/6 and non-Big 4/5/6 appears to be 
coarse, failing to adequately capture the dynamics of audit quality. Hogan’s (1997) and 
Willenborg’s (1999) findings are indeed valuable, as they document that underpricing is 
lower for issues audited by Big 6 firms. However, their studies leave the question 
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whether underpricing can be further mitigated by additional measures of audit quality 
unanswered. I first address this question by examining whether the ability of Big 4/5/6 to 
reduce IPO underpricing is attributable to a refined audit quality measure, industry 
specialization or differentiation of audit firms. If industry specialized/differentiated 
auditors are associated with a significant decrease in underpricing, this would lend 
additional support to the reputation hypothesis as industry specialization is widely 
acknowledged as an important determinant of auditor reputation. The next subsection 
relates prior studies of auditor industry specialization to this particular research question.  
Auditor Industry Specialization 
 
Claims by Big 6 audit firms of increased or increasing levels of industry 
specialization imply that firms perceive a net benefit to specialization (Hogan and Jeter 
1999), whether the benefits come from increased market share, profits, audit quality, or 
audit fees. A large body of literature has examined the issue of auditor specialization in a 
variety of contexts. Mayhew and Wilkins (2003) take a novel approach to study the 
impact of auditor industry specialization on IPO audit fees. Traditionally, the evidence in 
this area has been mixed (Palmrose 1986; Ward et al. 1994; Craswell et al. 1995), mostly 
likely due to the underlying theories offering competing predictions. On one hand, audit 
firms acquire a reputation as industry specialists by developing industry-specific skills 
and expertise over and above normal auditor expertise. To the extent that Big 4/5/6 
auditors invest in industry specialization, they require a return on this investment and, 
ceteris paribus, would be expected to charge higher fees compared to non-specialists for 
audits in these industries.  
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On the other hand, auditors develop industry specialization by increasing their 
clienteles. As a result, specialists could also achieve production economies and become 
more efficient, lower-cost producers of audits. Under these circumstances, the specialist 
audit firms would presumably earn a profit premium (due to their lower marginal costs). 
However, because only fees – not costs – are observable, empirical models could show 
that industry specialization results in lower fees. 
Mayhew and Wilkins (2003) attempt to reconcile the previous discrepancies 
surrounding the relation between auditor industry specialization and auditing fees. 
Drawing on Porter’s (1985) analysis of corporate strategy, auditor industry specialization 
is viewed as a differentiation strategy that provides auditors with a sustainable 
competitive advantage over non-specialist auditors.  In particular, they extend existing 
theory by considering both the supply and the demand for industry specialization. In the 
supplier’s view, the increased market share caused by industry specialization enables 
auditors to perform more cost effective audits, accruing benefits to both clients and 
auditors. From the demand side, an industry specialist audit firm provides a greater value 
proposition to its clients, as the audit is arguably a process and not simply a standardized 
report.  
The empirical results of Mayhew and Wilkins (2003) reveal that as audit firm 
industry market share increases, the audit fee charged for a given IPO decreases. This 
finding is consistent with the existence of industry-based economies of scale. On the 
other hand, the results show that industry-leading audit firms earn a 28.79 percent 
average premium once they possess substantially higher market shares than their 
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industry competitors. Thus the ability of a given audit firm to differentiate its services 
from competing audit firms appears to be crucial in understanding the impact of industry 
market share on IPO audit fees. Put alternatively, it appears that audit quality only 
matters if the firm is truly dominant, not just the leading firm in its audit industry. 
Indeed, additional evidence suggests that audit firm industry specialization may 
improve audit quality directly in focal industries. For example, Carcello et al. (1992) 
report a survey of Fortune 1,000 controllers who indicate that their auditors’ industry 
knowledge/expertise is a primary attribute of overall perceived audit quality. In the spirit 
of Carcello et al., Kwon (1996) shows that audit firms with industry specialization can 
better assess the reasonableness of clients’ discretion in applying accounting principles, 
thereby enhancing audit quality.  
According to the reputation hypothesis, IPOs are underpriced because problems 
of information asymmetry and adverse selection are extremely severe for new issues. To 
the extent that industry specialization signals increased service quality, my primary 
expectation is that underpricing will be reduced through selecting an industry specialist 
auditor. In contrast, there is also anecdotal evidence showing that audit firms with a 
relatively high market share are willing to take on higher risk clients, with the hopes of 
either getting higher fees now or higher fees in the future. Under this situation, industry 
specialization might be observed as having association with highly underpriced issues.  
Nevertheless, as an audit firm clearly establishes its dominant market position, it 
can earn fee premium simply due to its differentiated service quality (Mayhew and 
Wilkins 2003). It won’t be necessary for differentiated audit firms to sacrifice their 
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reputation in order to boost profits. Consequently, IPO associated with differentiated 
auditors are expected to have less underpricing as compared to those auditors by -
differentiated auditors. These notions lead to my first hypothesis: 
 
H1a: IPOs audited by an industry specialized auditor is associated with IPO  
         underpricing.  
H1b: IPOs audited by an industry differentiated auditor experience less  
         underpricing than IPOs audited by a non-industry differentiated auditor. 
 
Underwriter Industry Specialization 
It is widely agreed that the value of the auditors’ services in an IPO is in some 
ways contingent upon the extent to which the underwriter can reduce comparable 
uncertainty (Hogan 1997). In contrast to the auditors’ attestation to financial statements 
for both potential investors and underwriters, an underwriter provides assurance to and 
about the market for issuers. Specifically, the underwriter engages in two types of 
activities in a public offering: a distribution activity and an underwriting activity. In 
carrying out the distribution activity, underwriters act as a financial intermediary, aiding 
the issuing firm in designing and timing the offering and in distributing the securities. 
The underwriting function provides a guarantee to the issuer against the risk of 
fluctuations in the price of the offered securities. As a result, underwriters play a more 
vital role in the IPO process, particularly among start-up companies that do not have 
much financial information. 
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A number of finance studies maintain that an investment bank’s ability to 
perform its intermediary function relies on its reputation with investors and issuers 
(Beatty and Ritter 1986; Carter and Manaster 1990). The logic underlying these findings 
is the idea that prestigious underwriters put more reputation at stake with an offering and 
will try to avoid riskier issuers and the threat they pose to the reputation of underwriters.  
As a result, Booth and Chua (1996) report that issues underwritten by a prestigious bank 
attain a privileged status among investors, translating directly into higher IPO proceeds 
and lower underpricing.  
One way that underwriters commonly use to improve their reputation and gain 
market share is to specialize in a particular industry. This is readily apparent from the 
manner in which firms characterize themselves on their WebPages. For example, 
JPMorgan’s website at http://www.jpmorgan.com states that:  
JPMorgan’s investment bank is built on long-term relationships with its clients. 
Teams, specified by region and industry, provide in-depth market knowledge and 
experience and are dedicated to meet clients’ critical financial needs. (JPMorgan 2005) 
The JPMorgan website goes on to list 14 broad specializations: chemicals, 
consumer, diversified industries, financial institutions, financial and sponsor group, 
healthcare, mining & metals, oil & gas, power, paper, packaging & building products, 
real estate, technology, media & telecommunications, and transportation. The discussion 
of underwriter industry focus is also evident in Chen and Ritter (2000). They highlight 
that “by emphasizing industry expertise, the IPO underwriting business becomes one of 
differentiated products, reducing the number of viable competitors for any given deal.” 
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Clearly, this statement is congruent with the underlying theory for auditor industry 
specialization/differentiation. 
How do the advantages of developing industry specialization accrue to 
underwriters?  First, an underwriter’s ability to market an IPO depends on the quality of 
information it possesses about the issuer and investors. Information spillovers from one 
IPO to another help the underwriter improve its marketing skills, which should lead to 
increased pricing accuracy. Studies have documented a positive relation between 
reputations and offering price revisions in the primary market, a proxy for pricing ability 
(Benveniste et al. 2003; Ljungqvist and Wilhelm 2003). Better pricing skills acquired 
through specialization, in turn, will enable an underwriter to gain additional market 
share. 
Second, in the case of follow-on equity offerings, James (1992) finds that a firm 
was more likely to stay with its IPO underwriter if the bank had spent time acquiring 
relationship-specific knowledge about the firm’s operations and requirements. Similarly, 
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) show that a strong prior underwriting relationship was a 
significant determinant in a bank’s ability to win further equity underwriting business 
from a company. Such a relationship is not likely to exist pre-IPO, but a bank can 
compensate by specializing in certain industries. This gives them a superior 
understanding of the characteristics necessary for a successful IPO from these industries. 
With respect to the impact of underwriter quality on underpricing, there exist two 
schools of evidence in the finance literature. In the 1980s, a number of studies, 
represented by Carter and Manaster (1990) describe a negative relation between IPO 
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underpricing and IPO expert quality measure. They interpret this to imply a meaningful 
role of the underwriter in either signaling IPO risk or resolving uncertainty. On the other 
hand, Beatty and Welch (1996) find that higher quality underwriters (especially among 
large firms) and higher nominal issues underpriced more for a sample of 1992 to 1994. 
In particular, they employed a new measure of underwriter market share and controlled 
offering size in the model. But the reverse underwriter quality correlation remains robust 
regardless of variable definition. They conclude the relation between IPO underpricing 
and underwriter compensation has reversed due to differences in the economic 
environment. As a result, I don’t predict any direction for the impact of the general 
underwriter industry specialization on IPO underpricing. However, for differentiated 
underwriters whose services stand out from their competitors in a specific industry, I still 
expect the differentiation will signal the highest service quality, thus leading to less 
underpricing for IPOs. Thus, my second hypothesis states: 
 
H2a: IPOs underwritten by an industry specialist underwriter is associated with                   
         IPO underpricing. 
H2b: IPOs underwritten by an industry differentiated underwriter experience less  
          underpricing than IPOs underwritten by a non-industry differentiated  
          underwriter. 
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 Interaction of Auditor and Underwriter Industry Specialization 
Underwriters have a preference for reputable auditors since they usually rely on 
audited financial statements in certifying the value of firm and determining whether to 
underwrite the offering (Balvers et al. 1988; Menon and Williams 1991). To the extent 
that auditor and underwriter industry specialization both offer a positive signal about 
IPO quality, it indicates the possibility that bundling industry specialist underwriters and 
auditors together will accumulate the most advantageous leverage in increasing IPO 
proceeds.  Therefore, I expect IPO underpricing should be least prevalent when both 
specialists are in place.  
On the contrary, Balvers et al. (1988) builds a model demonstrating that as both 
the investment banker’s and auditor’s reputation increase, their collective impact on 
underpricing is reduced. In other words, for a higher reputation investment banker the 
effect of a higher reputation auditor on underpricing is positive (i.e., the collective effect 
is less negative). However, they fail to offer convincing explanations for this 
phenomenon except for appealing to the evidence of diminishing returns on information 
acquisition. Moreover, Balvers et al. use Big 8/non-Big 8 dichotomies (top 25 in ratings) 
to proxy auditor’s (underwriter’s) reputations, raising the familiar problems that these 
measures are broad and inadequate quality instruments.    
Coupling these competing arguments, I do not specify the direction for the 
relationship between auditor and underwriter specialization bundling and IPO 
underpricing. Therefore, H3 states:  
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H3: The bundling of industry specialist auditors and underwriters is associated  
       with IPO underpricing. 
  
Impact of Auditor (Underwriter) Industry Specialization on Underwriting Costs 
The primary benefit underwriters derive from providing their services is the gross 
spread – the percentage of the offer price retained by the underwriter. The gross spread 
is typically divided into a management fee (20 percent), an underwriting fee (20 
percent), and a selling concession (60 percent). Consistent with prior accounting 
literature (Menon and Williams 1991), my study focuses on the magnitude of 
underwriting fees.   
Evidence abounds that the level of underwriting fees is positively related to 
underwriter prestige (Carter and Manaster 1990; Menon and Williams 1991). However, 
adding a high reputation auditor can potentially change the fee structure of underwriters. 
Using a sample of 1,105 IPOs during 1985 and 1986, Menon and Williams (1991) 
observe a 6.4 percent auditor switch during the two-year period prior to an IPO, with the 
majority of these switches representing IPO clients going to larger auditors. In addition, 
they find that the compensation demanded by the underwriter is adjusted downward for 
higher levels of credibility offered by the issuer’s auditor.  The reduced underwriting 
cost arguably stems from the responsibilities taken on by higher quality auditors in the 
IPO process; that is, the underwriter’s risk is reduced. Put another way, a credible 
auditor can provide the underwriter with more assurance about the financial numbers 
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upon which the offering price is based and reduce the underwriter’s own information 
search costs.  
As both underwriters and clients typically prefer high quality auditors, industry 
specialist auditors should convey additional reputation advantages, leading to 
underwriters charging lower fees for clients audited by industry differentiated auditors 
(as more of the burden is placed on the audit firm). H4a formally tests this proposition: 
 
H4a: The underwriting fee is lower for IPOs audited by an industry differentiated  
         auditor than that for IPOs audited by a non-industry differentiated auditor. 
 
As for the impact of underwriter industry specialization on underwriting fees, it 
is unlikely that the relation will be unidirectional (i.e., either increase or decrease). 
Rather, I expect that the situation will be akin to the findings of audit fees in Mayhew 
and Wilkins (2003). That is, when underwriters can increase their market share by 
specializing in one industry, but fail to be the clear industry leader, the underwriting fee 
will be lower due to economies of scale. However, an underwriter will be able to earn 
fee premiums if it can successfully differentiate its service among competitors and 
becomes a dominant industry leader.  Thus, the next two hypotheses state: 
 
H4b: Due to the existence of competition and economies of scale, the  
         underwriting fee is lower for IPOs underwritten by an industry specialized  
         underwriter than that for IPOs underwritten by a non-industry specialized  
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         underwriter. 
H4c: Underwriters that have significantly higher industry shares than their  
         competitors earn higher fees than other underwriters do. 
 
IPO Long-term Performance 
In recent years, the facet that has attracted the most interest from academics in 
the realm of IPOs is the abnormally poor long-run returns. Underperformance has been 
documented persistently in the U.S. and across many different countries, constituting a 
direct challenge to the efficient markets hypothesis. The IPO underperformance 
anomaly, to the extent that it actually exists, was explained initially as issuers exploiting 
their informational advantage (Miller 1977). Conventional wisdom agrees that IPOs are 
often timed when the firm has reached a peak in its operating performance. As a result, 
insider selling around equity offerings suggests that issuers take advantage of 
overpricing at the time of a given offering. Some of the overvaluation, in certain 
situations, is due to earnings management by the issuer with those issuers that are most 
aggressive producing the worst long-run performances. Other studies (e.g., Teoh et al. 
1998) attempt to prove that biased earnings forecasts by analysts perpetuate investor 
optimism, which deters the price correction that would eliminate subsequent 
underperformance. More recently, behavioral theories (e.g., Heaton 2001) suggest that 
investors appear to be unable to see through earnings management and analysts’ 
forecasts to correct consistent mispricing.  
25 
 
 
In this dissertation, I draw upon the monitoring theories of Easterbrook (1984) to 
correlate IPO long-run performance with auditor and underwriter industry specialization. 
In an IPO, there is generally limited information available to prospective investors at the 
time of the offering. Investors must rely heavily on the content of the 
entrepreneur/manager’s self-disclosure in order to evaluate the performance and future 
prospects of the firm. In the absence of credible financial statements, market participants 
depend heavily on the specialized knowledge and monitoring abilities of underwriters 
and auditors.  
The empirical support that Big 4/5/6 auditors are likely to signal more effective 
monitoring mechanisms (thereby leading to better firm performance) is evident in the 
auditing literature (Menon and Williams 1991; Jain and Kini 1999). Within finance 
research, Hansen and Torregrosa (1992) explicitly examine whether lead investment 
bankers of the underwriting syndicates provide monitoring of corporate managers and 
affairs for capital-raising companies. Their findings indicate that lead bank monitoring 
improves corporate performance and reduces agency costs, thereby raising the 
company’s intrinsic value. 
To the extent that industry specialization enhances underwriter and auditor 
quality, two additional factors support the notion that IPO long-term performance should 
be positively related to the presence of industry specialist underwriters and auditors. 
First, auditor industry specialists possess an informational advantage (relative to non-
specialists) in their focus industries regarding a given IPO’s prospects. This information 
advantage enables industry specialist auditors to screen out issues having poor prospects 
26 
 
 
of future operating performance. The apparent advantage in doing so is that audit firms 
gain access to more lucrative revenues, such as non-audit fees in the after-IPO market 
and, to a large extent, these revenues are contingent upon the issuers’ continuing 
performance. Second, one important activity underwriters engage in the IPO process is 
price stabilization, including pre-IPO allocation policy, post-IPO purchases of shares by 
the lead underwriter, and the discouragement of selling. In part, the long-term 
performance of an IPO is a matter of the underwriter’s ability to stabilize the aftermarket 
price. In this vein, industry specialized knowledge/expertise about the firm’s operations 
and requirements enable an underwriter to perform price stabilization more successfully, 
increasing the long-term return of IPOs. The above discussions lead to my last 
hypothesis:  
 
H5: IPOs with industry specialized auditors and underwriters have better long- 
       term performance (1-year, 2-year, and 3-year) than issues having non-  
       specialized auditors and underwriters. 
 
Table 1 presents a summary of the hypotheses developed in this section. 
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III. SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Data Selection and Variable Measurements 
The sample used in the empirical test is drawn from the population of IPOs from 
1991 to 2001. The data source for the variables is the Security Data Company (SDC) 
World Wide New Issues database. Consistent with previous IPO research, my initial 
sample of 4,481 observations excludes IPOs with an offer price below $5 per share, best-
efforts offers, unit offers, closed-end mutual funds, as well as financial, insurance, and 
REIT offers. I further remove firms having missing SDC records for IPO accounting 
fees, underwriting fees, and all observations with missing data from COMPUSTAT and 
CRSP. The principal constraint for the sample is to get the variable of retained 
ownership of insiders. To compute auditor market share, I eliminate offerings occurring 
in the two-digit SIC industries with ten or fewer observations for auditing, consistent 
with Hogan and Jeter (1999) and offerings handled by non-Big 6 audit firms. Similarly, 
IPOs with less than five deals in the industry are deleted to derive the measure of 
underwriter market share. The final data contains 2,234 IPO issues for the underpricing 
(underwriting fee) model and 3,115 IPOs for the audit fee model. The combined sample 
of underpricing and audit fee models includes 1,996 observations. Table 2 offers a 
detailed description of the data selection. 
Panel A of Table 3 summarizes various firm-specific characteristics related to the 
combined sample of IPOs. Due to the presence of a few offerings made by very large 
firms (e.g., ENEL SPA, Deutsch Telekom AG, and AT&T Wireless Group) median 
values are more representative of the sample as a whole and thus will be the focus of my 
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discussion. Median IPO issue proceeds are roughly 32.2 million, and median pre-IPO 
total assets for my sample are roughly 17.9 million. The median underpricing 
experienced by the sample IPOs is 9.5% percent. Figure 1 also illustrates the 
underpricing magnitudes of the IPO firms across my sample period.  
Further, Panel B and C of Table 4 present general information related to the audit 
firm and underwriter specialization. To measure audit firm specialization based on total 
assets, I use the method employed by Hogan and Jeter (1999). In particular, each audit 
firm’s market share is calculated, per year, as the sum of the square root of assets of all 
firms that it audited in a given two-digit SIC code divided by the sum of the square root 
of assets across all COMPUSTAT firms in the same two-digit SIC code. The following 
equation describes the measure: 
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Where 
i    = an index of audit firms 
j    = an index of client firms 
k   = an index of client industries 
Ik  = number of audit firms in industry k 
Jik = the number of clients served by audit firm i industry k. 
The IPO literature has adopted the use of square root of the assets as a better 
measure of auditor industry concentration than the untransformed measure. For the sake 
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of completeness, however, I also calculate specialization measure based on volume – the 
number of firms audited in the same two-digit SIC code for that year. The measure of 
underwriter industry specialization is calculated in a similar approach. Specifically, the 
industry market share of each lead underwriter is defined as the percentage of the total 
IPO proceeds it underwrites in each two-digit SIC per year.  
In particular, Panel B (C) of Table 3 presents median values for selected 
measures based on audit firm (underwriter) industry specialization. For this analysis I 
define an accounting firm (underwriter) as being a “specialist” if the industry market 
share measure is greater than 20 percent in the year of the IPO. However, it is important 
to note that Panel B (C) is presented purely for illustrative purposes. Unlike prior 
industry specialization research that uses a market share cutoff to define specialists, my 
multivariate model incorporates a continuous market share measure because the 
underlying theory suggests that the impact of market share on underpricing is ambiguous 
unless differentiation exists. Panel B illustrates that auditor industry specialists tend to be 
associated with large offerings made by large firms. The issues handled by specialists 
appear to be similar in risk to issues audited by non-specialists. Each is comparably 
leveraged and has comparable inventory and receivables as a percentage of total assets, 
but specialist-audited firms have lower returns variance after the issue. Similar 
conclusion can be drawn for firms characteristics related to IPOs underwritten by 
industry specialists underwriters. Finally, the information in Panel B (C) suggests that 
auditor (underwriter) specialists, on average, engage in more (less) underpriced IPOs 
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relative to non-specialists. I examine these relationships more fully in the multivariate 
analysis.  
Finally, Panel D of Table 3 provides underpricing information relating to the 
quartiles of auditor and underwriter market share. It seems that both auditing firms and 
underwriters in the lowest market share quartiles are associated with underpriced IPOs. 
For audit firms, the level of underpricing does not vary whether their market shares fall 
in Q3 or Q4. In the case of underwriters, there is a clearly decline of underpricing if their 
market share goes from Q3 to Q4, suggesting the highest quartile market share is related 
to less undepricing. I also examine the median underpricing level for loss and profitable 
firms before IPO (not reported). The result does not show issuers having pre-IPO losses 
need to underprice more as compared to profitable IPOs. But a contingency table of the 
choice of auditor differentiation and firm type reveals that loss IPOs are more reluctant 
to select differentiated auditors. 
Industry Specialization and IPO Statistics 
In Table 4, I present audit firm (underwriter) specialization data and industry-
specific IPO data. Panel A of Table 3 shows the distribution of offerings for all 
industries having more than 50 IPOs between 1991 and 2001. The highest volume IPO 
industry is two-digit SIC code 73 (Business Services), with 683 issues during the sample 
period. The second highest volume industry is two-digit SIC 36, comprising 
semiconductors, electronic components, communications equipment, and the like. Five 
industries- two digit SIC codes 35, 28, 38, 36, 73 – account for more than 5% of the total 
issues individually and over 60 percent of the total issues as a group. Because these are 
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the industries that are likely to have the greatest growth potential, I control for them 
explicitly in the empirical analysis.  
Panel B (C) of Table 4 shows the distribution of audit (underwriter) specialists 
over time. For each year between 1991 and 2001 I used the COMPUSTAT tapes to 
determine the number of times each Big 4/5/6 firm had more than a 20 percent audit 
market share (again, based on percent square root of assets) in any two-digit SIC code. 
From the year of 1991 and 1997, Ernst & Young, and Arthur Anderson were specialists 
in more industries than any of the other firms and Coopers & Lybrand and Price 
Waterhouse had the smallest degree of specialization. I also find, consistent with 
Mayhew and Wilkins (2003), that the individual industries in which firms specialize 
remain relatively constant over time. Furthermore, the fact that the two firms (i.e., 
PriceWaterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand) with the least degree of industry 
specialization merged just after the end of 1997 suggests that industry specialization may 
have been a motivating factor in the merge. After the 1997 merge, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, the combined firm has the largest degree of industry 
specialization (an average of approximately 42 industries per year). 
Audit Firm (Underwriter) Differentiation 
In table 5 I offer a breakdown of audit firm (underwriter) differentiation by 
industry. For the purpose of both this table and the multivariate tests, an audit firm is 
defined as “differentiated” if it has the highest market share in the industry (two-digit 
SIC) during the IPO year and if its market share is at least ten percentage points higher 
than the nearest competitor in that industry following Mayhew and Wilkins (2003). 
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Likely, a differentiated underwriter must be the industry leader and its market share must 
exceed that of it closest competitor by at least 10 percentage. An audit firm (underwriter) 
can be “differentiated” in any given year and does not have to meet the above criteria for 
all sample years in order to be classified as a differentiated auditor (underwriter) in any 
given year. Panel A (B) of Table 5 presents a breakdown of auditor (underwriter) 
differentiation by industries across the sample years. It appears that only a few audit 
firms (about 3 percent) in my IPO sample are classified as “differentiated” in every 
sample year. However, it is not the case that these audit firms enter into this 
classification at random. In some cases, the audit firm is the industry leader in every 
sample year, but does not always have a 10 percent lead over its nearest competitor.  
Based upon my specification, 33 percent of the differentiated auditor IPO 
observations are associated with Ernst & Young and 22 percent are associated with 
Arthur Andersen. These findings are not surprising, given that these two firms are 
responsible for bring the most IPOs to market. What is interesting is that 76 percent of 
the differentiated Ernst & Young observations occur in IPOs involving Health Services. 
The greatest concentration of IPO for Andersen is in Electric, Gas, and Sanitary (8/33) 
and Amusement/Recreation Services (7/33). It is noteworthy that the new 
PricewaterhouseCoopers has been gaining market differentiation status (17 percent in 
total) as indicated by that almost half of its differentiated auditing cases occur in the 
years after the merge. Although the remaining firms are not differentiated frequently, 
they are concentrated on certain industries as well. For example, ten out of 21 issues for 
which Deloitte & Touche within these observations involved Apparel and Stores. 
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Similarly, seven out of the nine cases in which Cooper & Lybrand was the differentiated 
industry auditor involved with Communication industry before the merge. In sum, this 
analysis illustrate the IPO industries where differentiation tends to be mostly heavily 
concentrated – e.g. health care organizations and communication services – require a 
good amount of very specialized knowledge. My findings are comparable to what 
Mayhew and Wilkins (2003) documented except that my sample includes four more 
recent years (i.e., 1998-2001) and removes financial services industry. 
Interaction of Audit Firms and Underwriters 
Previous research demonstrates that underwriters exert considerable influences 
on the selection of auditors before a firm goes to public. To examine whether 
underwriters have preference for one specific auditor, Table 6 constructs a cross-
tabulation of auditors and top 20 underwriters based upon their mean market share 
across all sample years. The significant Chisq statistic (p-value of 0.02) suggests that 
certain relationships exist between these top 20 underwriters and Big 6 auditors across 
the sample period. As the underwriting market has undergone enormous changes during 
the past decade, I also repeat the cross-tabulation for each year in my sample period (not 
reported). No significant results stand out from these yearly combinations. 
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IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
IPO Underpricing Model 
OLS  for IPO Underpricing 
 
H1a and H1b, H2a and H2b, and H3 assess the impact of industry 
specialization/differentiation of auditors, underwriters, and their interaction on IPO 
underpricing. I run multivariate regressions to formally examine these proposed 
associations.  Using the entire sample, Equation (1a) reproduces the findings in prior 
studies that the general auditor reputation (i.e., Big 4/5/6 vs. non-Big 4/5/6) reduces IPO 
underpricing (Hogan 1997; Willengborg 1999). Next, I perform tests by restricting the 
sample to IPOs associated with Big 4/5/6 audit firms. Equation (1b), as an augmentation 
of equation (1a), allows investigation of the impact of auditor and underwriter industry 
differentiation as proxied by market share. I then append equation (1b) by adding 
variables reflecting the effects of auditor (underwriter) market share and interaction 
variables, as per equation (1c).  The multivariate analysis controls for the factors 
associated with IPO underpricing identified by prior studies (Beatty 1989 etc.). The 
regression models are specified as follows: 
 
UNDER = α0 + α1RETAIN + α2 1/OFFER + α3 PROC + α4STDDEV  
                         + α5 BIG4/5/6 + α6-8UNREP1(2,3) + α9RELAYR + ε                 (1a)     
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UNDER = α0 + α1RETAIN + α2 1/OFFER + α3 PROC + α4STDDEV    
                         + α5 FOREIGN + α6 HITECH + α7AUDIFF + α8UNDIFF 
                         + α9RELAYR + ε                                                                       (1b)                      
UNDER = α0 + α1RETAIN + α21/OFFER + α3PROC + α4STDDEV  
                         + α5FOREIGN  + α6HITECH + α7AUDSHR + α8UNDSHR +  
                         α9AUDSHR*UNDSHR +α10AUDIFF + α12UNDIFF +  
                         α12 AUDIFF*UNDIFF + α13RELAYR + ε                                (1c)                            
 
UNDER is the log of the sum of one and the first-day initial return. The log 
transformation mitigates distributional problems.4 The initial return for an IPO is defined 
as the first day gross return to an investor who acquires a share and sells at the closing 
bid price on the first day of public trading. As a sensitivity check, I also examine the 
underpricing level within one week and one month intervals after the offering. 
I include the percentage of ownership retained by pre-IPO shareholders 
(RETAIN) as a proxy for the quality of the issue. Research by Leland and Pyle (1977) 
suggests that the percent ownership retained by insiders signals private information 
possessed by owners/manager on the IPO’s valuation and thus serves to reduce the 
information asymmetry between the investor and issuer.  A negative coefficient would 
be consistent with higher quality issues incurring less underpricing.  
                                                 
4 These problems are the leptokurtosis exhibited by daily stock returns in general and the right-tailed 
skewness exhibited by IPO underpricing in particular.  
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The second control variable is the reciprocal of the offering price (1/OFFER) and 
serves as a control for the implicit insurance coverage provided by the audit firm 
(Willenborg 1999). The IPO issue proceeds (PROC) is another size control. STDDEV, 
defined as the standard deviation of the stock return one year after IPO, serves as a firm-
specific risk proxy. If underpricing tends to be larger for greater levels of IPO risk, the 
coefficient for this variable should be positive. In addition, underwriters’ reputation has 
been recognized as an important determinant of IPO underpricing (Beatty 1989; 
Willenborg 1999); therefore, I include three indicator variables to capture the impact of 
underwriter reputation in equation (1a). UNREP1 is a dichotomous variable which 
scored 1 if the underwriter has a market share of 10 percent or more rated by the 
Investment Dealer’s Digest (IDD) per IPO year and 0 otherwise. UNREP2 (3) takes a 
value of 1 if the market share of the underwriter is between 5 percent and 10 percent (1 
percent and 5 percent) based upon the ranking of IDD per IPO year and 0 otherwise. I 
expect the coefficients on these three reputation variables to be negative. 
I also include variables aimed at capturing the relationships between IPO 
underpricing and industry characteristics (Beatty 1989). HITECH is equal to 1 if the 
underlying IPO is a high technology company. I define High Tech firms following 
Bushee et al. (2001) as firms that have one of the following SIC codes: SIC codes 2833-
2836, 3612, 3612, 3621 to 3629, 3651, 3652, 3661 to 3669, 3671, 3672, 3674, 3695, 
4812 to 4822, 4832 to 4899, and 7370 to 7379. I expect the coefficient on HITECH to be 
positive based upon the results of prior studies. In addition, I include a dichotomous 
variables, FOREIGN, to capture the potential effects of foreign IPOs on underpricing.  
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Finally, prior studies argue that aggregate numbers disguise the fact that the 
degree of underpricing of firms going public has varied over the years. For example, 
during the Internet bubble years, firms with no immediate prospect of becoming 
profitable commonly came to market. I model these effects by using a categorical 
variable (RELAYR) to control for time-specific factors occurring across the sample 
period as compared to year 1991.  
The primary variables of interest for my study are AUDSHR, UNDSHR, 
AUDIFF, UNDIFF, as well as their interactions. I use AUDSHR, defined as the audit 
firm’s percent square root of assets audited in a particular client’s industry during the 
IPO year, to test H1a. Similarly, UNDSHR, defined as the underwriter’s percent square 
root of proceeds in a particular client’s industry during the IPO year, is used to test H2a. 
The regression coefficients on AUDSHR and UNDSHR are expected to be negative if 
industry specialization reflects higher service quality that can reduces underpricing. 
However, if industry specialized auditors and underwriters self select high underpriced 
IPOs in order to earn other economic benefits, these coefficients will be positively 
related to underpricing.  
As discussed previously, the coefficients on AUDIFF and UNDIFF are used to 
test H1b and H2b. AUDIFF (UNDIFF) is set to 1 if the audit firm (underwriter) has the 
highest market share in the industry (two-digit SIC) during the IPO year and if its market 
share is at least ten percentage points higher than the nearest auditor (underwriter) 
competitor in that industry. Practically speaking, the coefficient on AUDIFF (UNDIFF) 
measures the additional reduction of underpricing relative to all non-differentiated 
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auditors that is attributable to the accounting firm’s (underwriter’s) positions being the 
clear market leader. I expect that IPO underpricing will be significantly lower when the 
auditing firm (underwriter) retains a dominant status in the industry. The coefficients on 
the interaction of AUDSHR (AUDIFF) and UNDSHR (UNDIFF) are used to test H3, 
representing the impact of bundling industry specialist auditors and underwriters on 
underpricing. But I make no directional predictions on the coefficients. 
OLS Results 
 
Table 7 presents the Pearson’s correlation matrices. The high correlations 
between the independent variables indicate a potential multicollinearity problem. I 
attempt to assess the severity of the problems by computing variance inflation factors 
(VIF). The magnitudes of the VIF factors in Equation (1c) are less than three with the 
exception that the VIF for UNDSHR and the interaction of UNDSHR and AUDSHR is 
around seven. As an additional control, I remove the interaction variables from 1(c) and 
report the results separately (Column 1 in Panel B of Table 8).   
The first column in Panel A of Table 8 reproduces the results documented in 
prior research regarding the negative association of underpricing and Big 6 auditors. My 
adjusted R2 of 0.16 is much higher than the 7-9 percent reported in prior research (e.g., 
Balvers et al. 1988; Beatty 1989). The Big 6 indicator variable is significantly negative 
(p-value of 0.073), suggesting higher quality auditors are related to lower underpriced 
new issues. In addition, issues that are larger, less risky, with more retained ownership 
offer less underpricing to investors. Carter and Manaster (1990) describe a positive 
relation between IPO underpricing and their IPO expert quality measure. They interpret 
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this to imply a meaningful role of underwriters in signaling IPO risk. For my underwriter 
reputation proxies, only the coefficient of UNREP3 is significantly negative. The 
expected negative relation between IPO underpricing and underwriter quality is reversed 
for UNREP1 and UNREP2. Two factors may explain this result. First, my reputation 
proxies are different from those used in most prior studies, such as the Carter and 
Manaster’s reputation scale developed in the early1990s. I believe my measures of 
underwriter reputation are more accurate and dynamic to capture the changing nature of 
underwriter market as it allows variations across years. Second, there is greater 
likelihood that a firm issuing highly underpriced IPOs provides premium revenues and 
causes a ripple effect throughout other investment banking activities, such as trading 
commission generated from flipping sales. As a result, high reputation underwriters are 
attracted to reap these benefits regardless of the deep underpricing. 
Column two in Panel A of Table 8 offers results when only auditor and 
underwriter differentiation are included in the model (Equation 1b). Both the coefficients 
of AUDIFF and UNDIFF are negative as expected but insignificant. This finding 
suggests that failing to control industry specialization may pose potential threat to the 
model specification. My suspect is further confirmed by the results presented in Column 
three in which the market share of auditors and underwriters are included in the model 
(Equation 1c). After controlling for market share, results show that the coefficient on 
AUDIFF (UNDIFF) is negative and significant (t-statistic = 1.98 and 1.94 respectively), 
supporting H1b and H2b. This result suggests that differentiated audit firms 
(underwriters) are associated with lower underpricing relative to other audit firms 
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(underwriters). The equation is linear in logarithms, so the antilog of AUDIFF 
(UNDIFF)’s coefficient minus 1 represents the percentage effect of a differentiated 
auditor (underwriter) on underpricing. The -0.05 (-0.06) coefficient of AUDIFF 
(UNDIFF) translates into a 5 (6) percent reduce of underpricing for audit firms 
(underwriters) that successfully differentiate themselves from competitors. This decrease 
of underpricing reveals that differentiated audit firms (underwriters) supply services 
and/or value to their clients that audit firms (underwriters) with lesser market shares in 
the same industry cannot readily supply. If there were no differences in the services 
offered in terms of quality or value, there would be no differences in the magnitude of 
underpricing associated with differentiated audit firms or underwriters.  
With respect to H1a and H2a, the coefficients on AUDSHR and UNDSHR are 
positive and significant. This result suggests that as industry market share (i.e., 
specialization) increases, audit firms (underwriters) with a relatively high market share 
are willing to take on higher risk clients, with the hopes of either getting higher fees 
immediately or higher fees in the future. This is also evident in the descriptive statistics 
that the standard deviation of one year after IPO stock return is larger for auditor 
industry specialists (Panel B of Table 4). In other words, a positive coefficient doesn't 
necessarily mean that audit (underwriting) quality is decreasing (i.e., underpricing is 
increasing) with market share. It could simply mean that some of the higher market share 
auditors (underwriters) have been willing to take on clients that, by their nature, are 
going to have more underpricing. Corresponding to my finding, Beatty and Welch 
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(1996) conclude that high-quality underwriters insure themselves (their) capital by 
underpricing relatively more. 
For the interaction variables, both of them are positive but no interaction is 
significant. This result may be because IPOs associated with both industry differentiated 
auditors and underwriters only represent a very small portion of the entire sample (less 
than 2 percent). 
Regarding the control variables, I find that firms operating in HITECH industry 
usually underprice more. IPOs with more retained ownership and larger in offering size 
experience less degree of underpricing. The coefficient of reciprocal of offering price 
(1/OFFER) is significantly negative. This relation runs opposite to that reported in 
earlier studies, not only because of environmental change (perhaps because of the Penny 
stock Reform Act), but also because I also use proceeds as another size control. 
2SLS for Underpricing Model 
 
Prior studies contend that underpricing and auditor choice are likely to be jointly 
determined (Balvers et al. 1988; Hogan 1997). As such, the results of separate OLS 
estimation models may suffer from serious biases (Copley and Douthett 2002). To 
control for the sequential nature of these auditor choice/going public decisions, I 
reestimate equation 1(c) using two-stage least squares. In the first stage, I use a bivariate 
probit model with auditor differentiation choice as the dependent variable to instrument 
AUDIFF. Specifically, I regress AUDIFF on all of the other explanatory variables in 
equation 1(c), and obtain the predicted value of this variable. Then I apply the predicted 
values of AUDIFF from the first stage regression as independent variable in the second 
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stage regression of underpricing. I specify the second-stage instrument for AUDIFF as 
equal to one if the predicted value with a probability greater than 0.5 by the first-stage 
probit. 
As indicated by the second column in Panel B of Table 8, this 2SLS instrumental 
variable estimation generally confirms the OLS results. The two specialization variables 
are positively related to highly underpriced issues. The coefficients on differentiated 
auditors and underwriters are significantly negative. Findings based on OLS and 2SLS 
confirm that IPOs with differentiated auditors and/or underwriters experience lower 
level of underpricing. 
I also try to reestimate the model with the dependent variable replaced by one 
week underpricing and one month underpricing. The median underpricing for one week 
and one month is 0.08 and 0.13 respectively. For the regression using one week 
underpricing, the interested variables loss significance with the exception of UNDSHR. 
In the case of one month underpricing, however, all the specialization and differentiation 
variables retain their signs, but turn to be insignificant  
The underpricing regression is limited by the reduction in sample size imposed 
by RETAIN data requirements. In order to test the sensitivity of the results to this loss of 
observations, I rerun the regression, dropping RETAIN. The sample size increases from 
2,234 to 2,917, and the R2 increases from 21 percent to 31 percent. The interested 
variables have the same signs as in the previous model, but the F tests shows their 
significant levels are increased (p-values less than 0.005 for UNDSHR, AUDSHR, and 
UNDIFF, and p-value of 0.02 for AUDIFF). The results of this regression need to be 
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interpreted keeping in mind that RETAIN has been omitted and it may serve as a 
surrogate for the quality of the new issues.  
Auditor Switch before IPO 
 
According to Menon and Williams (1991), IPO firms tend to switch to more 
credible auditors prior to the offering. Descriptive analysis of my sample, not reported, 
demonstrates that only 2.8 percent of firms switched their auditors in the year preceding 
IPO, and four percent switched two years before the IPO. Among the 83 cases involving 
auditor switches the year before IPO, 19 firms had a non-Big4/5/6 auditor before the 
offering and changed to a Big4/5/6 when they went to public, and the rest 63 switches 
involve changes between Big4/5/6 auditors. When I include a dummy variable indicating 
auditor switch in the underpricing model, the coefficient is negative but insignificant. 
This result leads me to conjecture that it only matters to market that if the auditor switch 
is associated with change to industry specialists or differentiated auditors. Additional 
analysis reveals that 10 (21) out of the 19 (63) firms with non-Big4/5/6 (Big4/5/6) 
auditors before IPO selected a specialist auditor for the IPO. Moreover, five firms 
changed to a differentiated auditor for the IPO, a percentage relative high given that 
differentiated auditors only make up a very, very small minority of the overall 
population. 
As further analysis, Panel C of Table 8 presents the regression results after 
including a dummy variable indicating whether the switch involves a 
specialist/differentiated auditor. I find the coefficient of this dummy variable is 
significantly negative at the 0.05 level. And the R2 of the overall model is increased to 
44 
 
 
around 30 percent. The remaining variables in the model stay otherwise unchanged in 
terms of signs, but the significance of the interested variables tends to be higher than the 
main results. I interpret these results as additional support that the quality of auditors can 
be further differentiated among Big4/5/6 auditors. The benefits of reduced underpricing 
accrue exclusively to those IPOs that retain or switch to a differentiated auditor. The 
market doesn’t respond to any auditor switches in case the change only relates to a 
general brand name without specialization and/or differentiation. 
Additional Specification Check 
 
Bradley et al. (2004) found that the average underpricing for whole and fractional 
priced IPOs were 25.5 and 8.1 percent. They interpret this finding as the offer price is 
contingent on the amount of the information the underwriter collects, which is a function 
of the bank’s effort. Consistent with this notion, I include a variable indicating whether 
the offer price is a whole or fractional number.  Adding this variable does not change the 
overall model fit in terms of R2 and coefficients of interested variables. However, the 
coefficient of this indicator variable is significantly positive, confirming that IPOs priced 
as whole numbers underprice more (p-value of 0.02).  
It is perceived that IPOs perform abnormally during the Internet Bubble period 
(i.e., extra underpricing), I rerun the model for bubble years (1999 and 2000) and normal 
years separately. Different pictures emerge from the two sets of results. In the normal 
period, the four interested variables are properly signed, but no single variable attains 
significance. And the R2 is about 10 percent lower than the overall model, showing the 
model fit less well for the normal periods. In the case of bubble years, the model fit 
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increases slightly (R2 = 0.27). Another noticeable difference is that the coefficient of 
AUDIFF turns to be significantly positive, indicating that even differentiated auditors 
may intentionally engage in highly underpriced issues to earn other economic benefits 
during this abnormal period. As an additional control for time-specific factors, I also run 
equation (1c) for each sample year to detect whether the coefficients of variables of 
interest remain consistent over time. The R2s of these regressions range from 5 percent 
to 27 percent that occurs in year 1999. However, the regression results embody 
inconsistent features as those in the aggregated model. In most of the individual years, 
either the sign of the interested variables are reversed or the coefficients become 
insignificant. This finding suggests that short periods may not be able to detect the 
influences of industry specialization and differentiation on IPO underpricing.   
Audit Fee Model 
This study builds largely upon the theoretical framework presented in Mayhew 
and Wilkins (2003). As a robustness check, their propositions for auditor industry 
specialization/differentiation effects on auditing fees are replicated by the model 
specified in equation (2). Similar to other audit fee models, this regression model uses a 
set of variables to control for cross-sectional differences in factors that affect fees such 
as client size and audit complexity. These factors have been demonstrated to be good 
explanatory variables for the variation of audit fee levels across different samples, 
different time periods, and different countries.  
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ACCTFEE = β0 + β1ASSETS + β2 PROC + β3INVREC + β4DEBT +  
                      β5STDDEV + β6TOP5+ β7AUDSHR + β8 AUDIFF + β9RELAYR  
                      + ε                                                                                                    (2) 
where: 
ACCTFEE = log of the fees paid to the accounting firm associated with the IPO; 
ASSETS = log of firm total assets; 
PROC = log of IPO issue proceeds; 
INVREC = (inventory + accounts receivable) / assets; 
DEBT = total liability / total assets; 
STDDEV = standard deviation of stock returns one year after IPO; 
TOP5 = indicator variable equals to 1 if industry accounts for > 5 percent of 
total sample IPOs (two digit SIC of 28, 35, 36, 38, 48, or 73), and 0 
otherwise; 
RELAYR = a categorical variable for year 1992 to 2001 as compared to year 1991; 
AUDSHR = % of two-digit SIC COMPUSTAT square root of assets audited for        
the year; and  
AUDIFF = 1 if the market share spread between the IPO firm’s audit firm and          
the next highest ranking audit firm in the IPO firm’s two-digit                 
industry is at least ten percentage points and 0 otherwise. 
ε = error term 
 
The examination interval in Mayhew and Wilkin (2003) is between 1991 and 
1997. Therefore, I first run this audit fee model using the same period as in their study 
and then expand the test to 1991-2001 to assess whether the results can be generalized to 
a more inclusive period. My result (2SLS in Table 9) reveals similar findings as those 
documented in Mayhew and Wilkins (2003). Offerings that are larger, riskier, and more 
complex result in higher audit fees. A fee premium exists when the IPOs are in the 
common industries (i.e., TOP5 industries). The coefficient on AUDSHR is negative and 
significant, suggesting that as industry specialization increases, audit firms pass along to 
their clients a significant portion of the benefits attributable to economies of scale. The 
coefficient on AUDIFF is positive and significant. This result supports that differentiated 
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audit firms earn a fee premium relative to other audit firms. Further, regression using the 
extended period reveals the same relationships as those generated in the shorter period. 
Underwriting Fee Model 
H4a, H4b, and H4c examine whether the underwriting cost is reduced when the 
issuer selects an industry specialist/differentiated auditor and/or underwriter. These 
propositions are tested by the following equation developed in preceding research 
(Menon and Williams 1991):  
 
  UNFEE = γ0 + γ1STDDEV + γ2 PROC + γ31/OFFER + γ4RETAIN +     
                                  γ5UNDSHR + γ6UNDIFF + γ7 AUDIFF + γ8RELAYR + ε           (3) 
 
The dependent variable (UNFEE) is computed as the underwriting fees as a percentage 
of the offering proceeds in the US market. Following prior studies (e.g., Booth and 
Smith 1986), I contend that underwriting fees increase with the riskiness of the client as 
proxied by the standard deviation of stock returns one-year after an IPO (STDDEV). 
Economies of scale for the underwriter dictate that the underwriting fee decreases with 
increases in the size of the offering. In order to control for this potential impact, the size 
of the issue (PROC) is included as an independent variable. This variable may also 
surrogate for the riskiness of the issue (Booth and Smith 1986), which should yield a 
similarly negative coefficient. PROC is computed as the natural log of proceeds. The 
reciprocal of offer price (1/OFFER) and retained ownership of insiders (RETAIN) are 
defined in the same approach as with the underpricing model.  
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UNDSHR, UNDIFF and AUDIFF are the variables of primary interest in the 
analysis. If the coefficient of AUDIFF is found to be negative, it indicates the fee 
advantage accrued to issuers due to the selection of industry-differentiated auditors.  The 
coefficient of UNDSHR is also expected to be negative as it captures the effect of 
economies of scale. Finally, differentiated underwriters are expected to be able to earn 
fee premiums. If they do, the coefficient of UNDIFF should be positive.  
Table 10 presents the results for the overall sample with respect to underwriter 
compensation, as well as results for IPOs in large and small size portfolios (i.e., above 
and below the median assets). The overall model has modest fit (adjusted R2 = 0.31). 
And the coefficients on control variables are consistent with prior studies. Especially, 
the log of proceeds is negatively significant, reflecting economic of scale effect. The 
reciprocal of offer price (1/OFFER), as an additional control for offering risk, is positive 
and significant.  As insiders retain more company stocks, the results suggest that 
underwriting fees is reduced but insignificantly. Also, the risk proxy (STDDEV) fails to 
be significant even its sign is positive.  
Regarding the interested variables, the coefficients on UNDSHR is positive, and 
the coefficients on UNDIFF and AUDIFF are negative. But no one is significant. A 
likely explanation for the lack of significance of these variables is that underwriting 
compensation is determined differently for large and small IPOs. Consequently, I 
partition the sample into two size portfolios. For large (greater than median assets) IPOs, 
I found the underwriter market share is significantly negative (p-value less than 0.10), 
suggesting impacts of economy of scale. The coefficient on differentiated underwriter is 
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positive but insignificant. This finding shows that bi-directional trends of fees exist for 
specialized and differentiated underwriters, a phenomenon similar to what Mayhew and 
Wilkins (2003) found in auditing market.  However, I do not find that the presence of 
differentiated auditors can reduce underwriting fees as the coefficient of AUDIFF 
remains slightly positive. It indicates the substitution role of auditors in large IPOs is not 
an important determinant of underwriter compensation.  
An examination of the results in Column three of Table 10 reveals a different 
picture for small IPOs. First, the underwriter market share (UNDSHR) tends to be 
significantly positive, reflecting that underwriters will charge more as their reputations 
increase. Unlike those findings in large firms, the coefficient on UNDIFF is significantly 
negative. Combining these two results suggests that underwriters with general reputation 
are more concerned about the riskiness of small IPOs and require additional 
compensation for the engagements. The economic of scale effect on underwriting cost 
may only be shown in the very few cases where differentiated underwriters are involved. 
Further, the marginally negative coefficient of AUDIFF confirms that hiring a 
differentiated auditor may decrease the underwriting fee. But this finding is only valid 
among small IPOs. Presumably, auditors certify (or provide quality assurance for) small 
issues to their underwriters. 
In sum, underwriting fee seems to reflect an economy of scale of IPO offering 
size; and riskier offerings have to pay more to their underwriters. Small and large IPOs 
perform oppositely regarding the impact of underwriter and audit quality on 
underwriting compensation. That is the reason why the overall results provide 
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inconclusive findings. In particular, the presence of a high-quality auditor may reduce 
compensation that has to be paid to the underwriters, especially among small firms. 
There is no evidence of high quality auditors can reduce underwriter compensation 
among large IPOs.   
As an additional specification control for underwriter quality, I replace UNDSHR 
and UNDIFF by the three underwriter reputation variables based upon the ranking of 
IDD, and rerun the model for both large and small IPOs. In the case of small issues, 
UNREP1 (i.e., underwriters with 10 percent market share) is positively related to the 
dependent variable, reflecting the expected quality differences between the groups of 
companies underwritten by different underwriters. For large issues, no underwriter 
reputation variable appears to be related to underwriter compensation.  Again, these 
evidence buttress that in my sample, reputation of underwriters plays a less critical role 
in influencing underwriter compensation among large IPOs.    
Empirical Method for IPO Long-term Performance 
In measuring long-run performance, one can focus either on raw (absolute) 
performance or performance relative to a benchmark (abnormal returns). Ritter and 
Welch (2002) show that investing in an equal-weighted portfolio of IPOs over a three-
year horizon did not lose money in absolute terms, but an investment in the value-
weighted market portfolio would have yielded about twice the return, resulting in a 
three-year market-adjusted return of –23.4 percent. Still, there is no consensus with 
respect to the proper measurement technique. Also, the sample used, both in terms of the 
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sample period and the sample selection criteria, is an important determinant in findings 
across studies.  
I analyze IPO long-term performance for the time period beginning one year 
before the IPO to three years after the offering. Drawing on Mikkelson et al. (1997), my 
primary measure of operating performance is operating income before deducting 
depreciation, interest, taxes, and extraordinary items, divided by end-of-year assets. This 
scaling converts operating income into an operating return on assets and allows 
comparisons over time and across firms. IPOs typically lead to a substantial increase in 
assets, which potentially imparts a downward bias to measures of operating income 
scaled by assets. Thus, I also examine operating income scaled by sales. I expand the 
model of Jain and Kini (1994) to jointly test their association by estimating multiple 
regressions of the following form: 
 
PERF = φ0 + φ1MRETAIN + φ2MUNDER + φ3AUDSHR + φ4UNDSHR +  
              φ5AUDIFF + φ6UNDIFF + ε                                                                  (4)       
                                                      
The dependent variable (PERFit) is the raw operating performance measure. 
Regressions employing the change in performance measured from years 0, +1, +2, +3, 
and the average of years +1 to +3 relative to year -1 are also estimated.  The regression 
model controls for two primary variables proved to impact IPO long-term returns in 
prior literature; MRETAIN and MUNDER. MRETAIN is a dummy variable that takes a 
value of 1 if managers retain more than the median ownership retention level for the 
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sample after the IPO and 0 otherwise. Similarly, MUNDER is a dummy variable that 
takes a value of 1 if underpricing exceeds the median underpricing level and 0 otherwise.  
The coefficients of AUDSHR, UNDSHR, AUDIFF, and UNDIFF are expected to be 
positive based on H5.  
Descriptive statistics, not tabulated, indicates that the average of ROA in the year 
prior to the IPO year is –6.24 percent, and it spikes at 8.73 percent in the IPO year. After 
the offering, the operating performance start to fall as shown by the magnitudes of ROAs 
in years +1, +2, +3 are 3.77 percent, 0.67 percent, and –1.43 percent respectively. This 
trend is consistent with the pervasive literature that documents decreasing long-term 
performance of IPOs.  
Table 11 presents four sets of regression results that show how the change and 
average operating performance of IPOs are associated with the market share and 
differentiation of the incumbent auditors and underwriters. In the three change 
regressions (i.e., +1, +2, and +3 to 0), the increases of underwriter market share are 
positively related to higher long-term operating performance, and two of them are 
significant (p-value of 0.01 and 0.06 respectively). This is consistent with the hypothesis 
that the presence of specialist underwriters offers additional monitoring mechanism of 
IPO performance. Another rationale for this result is that high quality underwriters are 
scrutinous about their clients to protect their reputation. As a result, only IPOs with 
relatively better performance are capable of attracting underwriters with larger market 
shares in order to provide a positive signal to the market. The auditor market share, 
however, are not found having significant and consistent association with IPO long-term 
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performance. This might be due to the longer tenure periods of the associated auditor 
that prevent them from foreseeing the operating performance of IPOs at the time of 
engagement. The results also indicate no apparent relationship of underwriter 
differentiation with long-run performance of IPOs. Finally, the coefficients of auditor 
differentiation are positive in all three equations, but in no case are significant. With 
respect to the results employing the average performance of +1, +2, +3 relative to –1, no 
significant results are detected for either the market share or differentiation variables.  
Note the adjust R2 is very low (less than 0.001) in these regressions, reflecting the fact 
that there are many other factors, not identified in the model, impact the long-term 
performance of IPO firms. Regressions using the operating performance scaled by sales, 
not reported, reveal similar findings. 
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V. SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSIS AND SENSITIVITY TESTS 
 
Alternative Measures of Industry Specialists and Differentiation 
I tried two specifications to broaden the differentiation definition for auditors and 
underwriters. Firstly I defined as AUDIFF (UNDIFF) any audit firm (underwriter) 
having a 15 (as opposed to 10) percentage point lead over its closest audit competitors. 
The findings with this alternative specification are virtually identical to the findings 
presented in Table 8. That is, specialists that dominate their industries are able to reduce 
IPO underpricing. I also decrease the required market share lead to 7.5 percentage 
points. My purpose in this analysis is to illustrate that a specialist audit firm 
(underwriter) must be the clear industry leader to have an incremental impact on 
underpricing, auditor and underwriter fees, and IPO long-term performance. With this 
specification, the coefficients for UNDSHR and UNDIFF are identical to those 
presented in Table 8. However, the coefficients for AUDSHR and AUDIFF remain 
negative and positive respectively, but become insignificant.  This finding suggests that 
the line dividing differentiated auditors from non-differentiated auditors (underwriters) 
begins to blur below a 10 percent market share lead for audit firms.   
Client Size, Industry Effects, and Audit Firm Effects  
Willenborg (1999) shows that small deals such as Development Stage 
Enterprises (DSEs), are less concerned with the quality of auditors as the risk of 
company survival is prevailing. For my sample of US IPOs, I run separate analyses for 
small (below median assets) and large (above median assets) clients to assess the 
potential impact of client size on the results. As a reminder, the median assets of my 
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sample are 17.5 million. For small firms, the two variables related to underwriter effects 
(UNDSHR and UNDIFF) are appropriated signed and remains highly significant at 
0.001. While the sign of AUDSHR and AUDIFF remain the same, their significance 
levels are reduced below the normal cutoff (p-value greater than 0.10). Thus, H2b are 
only supported in the small firm segment. One potential explanation for these results is 
that the role of underwriters are extremely vital for small firms as they more rely upon 
underwriters’ service in consulting, certificating, as well as distributing of the new 
issues. 
Among large firms, the only variable that stays the same as in the main results is 
auditor market share (AUDSHR). The coefficients of UNDIFF and AUDIFF remain 
negative but insignificant, suggesting weak effects of differentiation in the large IPO 
segment. This result may be related to the fact that larger IPOs are less subjective to the 
information asymmetry problem as smaller IPOs do. As a result, distinction between the 
role of specialized and differentiated auditors/underwriters becomes clouded, leading to 
insignificant results.   
Table 4 shows that the health services industry (SIC code 80) accounts for 
approximately 30 percent of the differentiated observations. To ensure that AUDIFF and 
UNDIFF are not simply capturing underpricing attributable to a particular industry in 
which a number of nonstandard IPO issues likely exists, I included an additional 
indicator variable (HEALTH) defining firms in this industry. The coefficient for 
HEALTH is slightly positive (0.002) and insignificant (t-statistic = 0.09). The 
coefficients for AUDSHR, UNDSHR, AUDIFF, and UNDIFF remain significant.  
56 
 
 
As an additional control for industry effects, I estimated a fixed-effect model 
using indicator variables for each industry that makes up more than 10 percent of the 
observations. The reason I did not use all industries is that most of them have only 4 to 
15 observations. Regarding the results, the coefficients of SIC codes 13 and 28 are 
insignificantly negative. All other coefficients of industry dummies are positive and six 
of them are significant (SIC codes 35, 36, 38, 50, 58, and 73). The main results of the 
interested variables are not changed with the exception that auditor differentiation 
(AUDIFF) becomes insignificant. It seems the effect of differentiated auditors is reduced 
after controlling for industry factor.  
Lastly, to ensure that no single audit firm was responsible for the results of my 
study, I ran six additional regressions removing one auditor each time. Generally, I 
found the main results were sensitive to the including or excluding of individual firms.  
The only exclusion of audit firm that did not change the results is Deloitte & Touch. For 
other auditors, either the variables for underwriter (Arthur Anderson and KPMG) or 
auditors (Coopers, Ernst & Young, and Pricewaterhouse) become insignificant without 
changing signs. 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND LIMITATIONS  
 
This paper adds to the body of evidence that indicates that the supply of auditing 
services in not homogeneous by addressing the association of auditor industry 
specialization/ differentiation and IPO underpricing and long-term performance. Despite 
uniform certification requirements and generally accepted auditing standards, it appears 
that users of audited financial statements perceive auditors as having different levels of 
credibility and make economic decisions on this basis. My findings do suggest that 
differentiated auditors are associated with less IPO underpricing due to their highest 
service quality. This result should be of great interest of a number of parties taking part 
in the IPO market, including IPO firms, auditors/underwriters, and regulators as well.  
My study also reveals similar evidence on the impact of differentiated 
underwriters on IPO underpricing. That is, underpricing can be reduced if firms select 
industry-differentiated underwriters when going to public. Further analysis indicates as 
the market share of underwriters increase, the long-term operating performance of the 
IPOs they are engaged tend to be superior to those of underwriters with less market 
share. I interpret this result as underwriters are more protective of their earned reputation 
when they have larger market shares.  
As with most empirical studies, the dissertation is subject to several limitations. 
First, I did not pursue the restrictions to the demand for industry specialization. For 
example, there may be other ways that audit firms can differentiate themselves and 
industry specialization may not be the most important differentiation mechanism for a 
given client. Small clients may prefer personalized relationships with an audit firm 
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having a small client base, rather than with a firm that offers general industry 
specialization. In other cases, the threat of leaking proprietary information to competitors 
may induce a client to avoid an auditor who audits its competitors. Second, there are 
alternative measurements of auditor industry specialization based on extant literature, 
and this dissertation is not exhaustive in exploring all these different proxies. Finally, the 
explanatory power of the long-term performance is very low indicating that the 
introduction of a better-specified model is the next step development of this part of the 
dissertation. 
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FIGURE 1
Underpricing Trend Over the Period of 1991 to 2001
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TABLE 1  
 
Summary of Hypotheses 
 
              
  Independent variables 
Dependent variables 
Auditor 
market 
share 
Auditor 
differentiation 
Underwriter 
market share
Underwriter 
differentiation 
Interaction of 
auditor and 
underwriter 
market share
Interaction of 
auditor and 
underwriter 
differentiation 
       
       
IPO underpricing H1a (-) H1b (-) H2a (-) H2b (-) H3 ? H3 ? 
       
IPO underwriting fee H4a (-) H4a (-) H4b (-) H4c (+)   
       
IPO long-term performance H5a (+) H5a (+) H5a (+) H5a (+)     
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Beginning sample of all IPOs from SDC 5,995
Remove unit offerings, and IPOs in finance, insurance, and real estates industries (SIC code between 6000-7000). 1,514
Remove IPOs with offering price less than $5. 112
Remove IPOs in industries having less than 5 IPOs in each year 510
Remove IPOs with Non-Big4/5/6 auditors 436
Removing IPOs with missing data due to:
     standard deviation of stock returns in CRSP 18
     !) underpricing, underwriting fee, and retained ownership 1,171
        Final Sample for underpricing and underwriting fee model 2,234
     2) pre-IPO assets in Compustat 290
        Final Sample for audit fee model 3,115
Total combined sample 1,996
TABLE 2
Sample Selection over the Period 1991 to 2001
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Panel A: Financial and Market Share Measures
Median
Standard 
Deviation
IPO Underpricing 0.095 0.442
Accounting Fees 175,000.000 186,599.130
Underwriting Fees ($ millions) 0.500 0.590
IPO Proceeds ($ millions) 32.200 62.025
IPO Firm Assets ($ Millions) 17.988 310.772
Retained Ownership of Insiders 0.004 0.032
(Inventory + Accounts Receivable)/Assets 0.387 0.251
Debt (Liability/Assets) 0.685 0.698
Post-IPO 1-Year Standard Deviation of Returns 0.046 0.021
Foreign IPOs 0.000 0.204
Loss IPOs 0.000 0.466
Share of Two-digit SIC Audit Market (% square root assets) 0.172 0.068
Share of Two-digit SIC Audit Market (% volume) 0.180 0.059
Share of Two-digit SIC Underwriter Market (% square root proceeds) 0.063 0.112
Auditor differentiation 0.000 0.156
Underwriter differentiation 0.000 0.148
Panel B: Comparison of Characteristics of IPOs Audited by Specialist versus Nonspecialists
Specialists 
(n=746)
Nonspecialists 
(n=1,220)
Median IPO Underpricing 0.300 0.185*
Median Accounting Fees 250,230.960 211,126.70*
Median Underwriting Fees ($ millions) 0.720 0.590*
Median IPO Proceeds ($ millions) 54.361 40.071*
Median IPO Firm Assets ($ Millions) 83.195 64.909*
Median Retained Ownership of Insiders 0.270 0.292*
Median (Inventory + Accounts Receivable)/Assets 0.381 0.399
Median Debt (Liability/Assets) 0.752 0.784
Median Post-IPO 1-Year Standard Deviation of Returns 0.055 0.048*
Median Share of Two-digit SIC Underwriter Market (% square root proceeds) 0.088 0.078*
Panel C: Comparison of Characteristics of IPOs Underwritten by Specialist versus Nonspecialists
Specialists 
(n=177)
Nonspecialists 
(n=1,789)
Median IPO Underpricing 0.174 0.234*
Median Accounting Fees 272,937.850 221,317.42*
Median Underwriting Fees ($ millions) 1.156 0.585*
Median IPO Proceeds ($ millions) 104.327 39.377*
Median IPO Firm Assets ($ Millions) 327.515 45.423*
Median Retained Ownership of Insiders 0.280 0.284
Median (Inventory + Accounts Receivable)/Assets 0.347 0.399*
Median Debt (Liability/Assets) 0.805 0.769*
Median Post-IPO 1-Year Standard Deviation of Returns 0.038 0.051*
Median Share of Two-digit SIC Audit Market (% square root assets) 0.192 0.183
TABLE 3
Summary Statistics for 1,966 IPOs (1991-2001) Audited by Big 6 Audit Firms
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Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
Auditor market share 0.08 0.089 0.107 0.107
Underwriter market share 0.062 0.09 0.125 0.112
Auditor and underwriter market share 0.055 0.095 0.134 0.111
TABLE 3 (continued)
* Indicates value for Specialists is significantly different (p<=0.05) from value for Nonspecialists using a
Wilcoxon Sign Rank Test
a In Panel B (C), an auditor (underwriter) is defined as a "specialists" if it audited (underwrote) 20
percent or more of the two-digit square root assets (proceeds) in the IPO year. 
Panel D: Underpricing and Quartile Market Share
Median Underpricing
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Panel A: Industries Having >= 50 IPOs between 1991 and 2001
Two Digit SIC Code 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total
28 - Chemicals and Allied Products 3 21 20 16 23 32 19 7 5 20 4 170
35 - Industrial and Commercial Machinery 1 13 28 19 26 19 16 6 4 6 138
36 - Electronic/Other Electrical Equipment 1 27 42 27 34 27 19 8 21 26 2 234
38 - Measuring/Analyzing Equipment 3 27 21 12 22 52 23 4 13 4 181
48 - Communications 6 15 9 11 15 7 5 22 14 104
50 - Wholesales 1 6 9 9 8 13 10 2 58
58 – Eating and Drinking Places 3 10 10 7 8 10 2 50
59 - Miscellaneous Retails 11 8 4 4 9 9 6 9 2 62
73 - Business Services 4 35 47 44 84 156 73 44 141 50 5 683
80 - Health Services 5 18 11 11 14 16 12 3 1 91
87 - Engineering/Accounting Services 1 3 9 4 5 14 15 51
Total 22 177 220 162 239 363 203 7 7 6 1,406
All Other Industries 0 49 123 64 26 62 44 102 205 137 16 828
Total Sample IPOs 22 226 343 226 265 425 247 109 212 143 16 2,234
Audit Firms 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total
Arthur Anderson 24 22 22 20 21 24 27 27 26 26 21 260
Coopers & Lybrand 6 7 6 10 11 11 6 57
Ernest & Young 34 35 33 35 34 33 33 34 33 37 33 374
Deloitte & Touche 18 19 17 18 13 16 16 15 17 19 19 187
KPMG Peat Marwick 22 22 24 23 21 21 20 19 14 17 16 219
Price Waterhouse 10 12 10 9 9 11 13 40 39 42 42 237
TABLE 4
Industry IPO Data and Audit Firm (Underwriter) Specialization Data
Panel B:  Number of Compustat Two-Digit Industries (not restricted to IPO firms) in which Audit Firms Has >=20% of Square Root of 
Assets Market Share
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Underwriters 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total
BT-Alex-Brown 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 9
CS-First Boston 2 1 1 4
Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 12
First Boston Corp 2 1 3
Goldman Sachs 5 3 4 4 2 3 4 3 2 2 32
Merrill Lynch 3 1 2 2 2 1 1 12
Montgomery 1 1 1 1 4
Mabon Securities Corp 3 1 2 2 6 1 15
Paine-W 4 1 5
Salomon-Smith 2 1 6 2 2 13
Total of Top 10 Underwriters 11 14 10 11 13 15 14 12 4 4 1 109
Others 0 4 7 7 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 23
Total 11 18 17 18 14 16 15 13 5 4 1 132
Panel C:  Number of Compustat Two-Digit Industries (restricted to IPO firms) in which Lead Underwriters Has >=20% of Square 
Root of Proceeds Market Share
Table 4 (continued)
  
72
Auditor Industry SIC
# 
IPOs
Mean 
Auditor 
Market 
Sharea
MarketShare of 
the Closest 
Competitor
Arthur Anderson Construction Special Trade Contractors 17 2 0.473 0.216
Lumber and Woods Products 24 5 0.528 0.172
Motor Freight Transportation 42 1 0.321 0.217
Electric/Gas and Sanitary Services 49 8 0.367 0.244
Auto Dealers and Gas Stations 55 2 0.329 0.213
Hotels/Other lodging Places 70 3 0.405 0.217
Personal Services 72 1 0.328 0.215
Amusement/Recreation Services 79 7 0.467 0.204
Engineering, Accounting and related 87 4 0.302 0.18
Coopers & Lybrand Tobacco Products 21 1 0.896 0.074
Communications 48 7 0.332 0.196
Personal Services 72 1 0.379 0.244
Ernst & Young Mining and Quarrying 14 2 0.487 0.286
Textile Mill Products 22 5 0.436 0.207
Motor Freight Transportation 42 1 0.423 0.274
Transportation Services 47 1 0.418 0.255
Motion Pictures 78 3 0.375 0.245
Health Services 80 39 0.385 0.23
Deloitte & Touche Transportation Equipment 37 1 0.307 0.195
General Merchandise Stores 53 6 0.323 0.165
Food Stores 54 4 0.402 0.207
Apparel and Accessory Stores 56 10 0.343 0.197
KPMG Peat Marwick Auto Dealers and Gas Stations 55 1 0.360 0.187
Printing, Publishing and Allied Industries 83 2 0.357 0.221
Price Waterhouse Agricultural Production Crops 1 2 0.389 0.255
Food and Kindred Products 20 2 0.379 0.22
Electric/Gas and Sanitary Services 28 4 0.353 0.179
Fabricated Metal Products 34 1 0.381 0.213
Industrial and Commercial Machinery 35 1 0.343 0.189
Measuring/Analyzing and Controlling 38 6 0.369 0.249
Personal Services 72 1 0.475 0.193
Educational Services 82 3 0.451 0.171
Engineering, Accounting and related 87 6 0.323 0.221
b Mean auditor market share is calculated as the simple mean of the auditor's two-digit SIC market share (based on 
Compustat) across all represented IPO years. For example, Ernst & Young was the differentiated auditor in 39 
Health Services IPOs between 1991 and 2001. The mean auditing market share 0.385 reported above is the 
average Ernst & Young market share across all sample years, weighted by the proportion of its total IPOs occurring 
in each sample year. Ernst & Young's simple average underwriting market share across sample period is 0.387.
Panel A: Auditor Differentiation 
Auditor and Underwriter Differentiation among IPOs Occurring between 1991 and 2001
TABLE 5
a"Differentiated" auditors are audit firms having both the highest two-digit SIC market share (defined in terms of 
percent square root of assets) and a market share of at least 10 percentage over the closest audit competitor in the 
year of the IPO
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Underwriter Industry SIC # IPOs
Mean 
Underwriter 
Market Sharea
MarketShare of 
the Closest 
Competitor
Alex-Brown Motor Freight Transportation 42 8 0.655 0.143
Transportation Equipment 37 1 0.624 0.156
Home Furniture/Equipment Stores 57 3 0.547 0.239
CS-First Boston Oil and Gas Extraction 13 2 0.513 0.162
Measuring/Analyzing and Controlling 38 3 0.374 0.153
Electric/Gas and Sanitary Services 49 1 0.646 0.143
Eating and Drinking Places 58 2 0.484 0.17
Educational Services 82 4 0.819 0.181
DLJ Food and Kindred Products 20 1 0.471 0.261
Rubber and Miscellaneous 30 1 0.521 0.141
Food Stores 54 1 0.450 0.216
Home Furniture/Equipment Stores 57 2 0.657 0.26
Eating and Drinking Places 58 1 0.681 0.096
Miscellaneous Retail 59 1 0.637 0.237
Amusement/Recreation Services 79 2 0.727 0.16
Goldman Sachs Oil and Gas Extraction 13 4 0.596 0.123
Food and Kindred Products 20 2 0.577 0.237
Printing/Publishing and Allied Industries 27 1 0.508 0.166
Industrial and Commercial Machinery 35 4 0.436 0.195
Communications 48 30 0.508 0.142
Electric/Gas and Sanitary Services 49 5 0.713 0.179
Building Materials/Garden Supply 52 1 0.687 0.101
General Merchandise Stores 53 2 0.554 0.188
Lehman Brothers Oil and Gas Extraction 13 3 0.839 0.077
Industrial and Commercial Machinery 35 3 0.312 0.095
Electric/Gas and Sanitary Services 49 3 0.610 0.158
Merrill Lynch Communications 48 10 0.505 0.184
Wholesales 50 1 0.489 0.127
Apparel and Accessory Stores 56 1 0.508 0.136
Miscellaneous Retail 59 2 0.423 0.179
Motion Pictures 78 1 0.593 0.206
Health Services 80 2 0.508 0.105
Morgan Stanley Textile Mill Products 22 1 0.734 0.106
Paper and Allied Products 26 2 0.538 0.235
Electronics 36 6 0.634 0.115
Transportation Equipment 37 2 0.721 0.087
Morgan Stanley Textile Mill Products 22 2 0.602 0.157
Dean Witter & Co Printing/Publishing and Allied Industries 27 2 0.758 0.107
Transportation Equipment 37 3 0.457 0.139
Transportation Services 47 1 0.678 0.235
Salomon Brothers Oil and Gas Extraction 13 1 0.485 0.224
Communications 48 2 0.502 0.161
Hotels/Other lodging Places 70 2 0.549 0.227
Amusement/Recreation Services 79 2 0.645 0.231
Panel B: Underwriter Differentiation 
TABLE 5 (continued)
c"Differentiated" underwriters are investment bankers having both the highest two-digit SIC market share (defined in 
terms of percent of square root of assets) and a market share of at least 10 percentage over the closest underwriter 
competitor in the year of the IPO.
d Mean underwriter market share is calculated as the simple mean of the underwriter's two-digit SIC market share 
(based on SDC) across all represented IPO years. For example, GS was the differentiated underwriter in 30 
communication IPOs between 1991 and 2001. The mean underwriter market share 0.508 reported above is the 
average Merrill underwriting market share across all sample years, weighted by the proportion of its total IPOs 
occurring in each sample year. GS's simple average underwriting market share across sample period is 0.443.
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Underwriters Arthur Anderson
Coopers & 
Lybrand Ernst & Young Deloitte & Touche
KPMG Peat 
Marwick Price Waterhouse Total Percentage
Goldman, Sachs 49 25 69 35 41 69 288 12.25%
Merrill Lynch 46 16 44 34 33 29 202 8.59%
DLJ 43 14 48 14 29 34 182 7.74%
Morgan Stanley 24 21 42 20 24 21 152 6.47%
Lehman Brothers 32 19 43 19 25 32 170 7.23%
CS-First Boston 33 8 33 24 19 34 151 6.42%
MSDW 15 4 29 13 13 29 103 4.38%
Alex-Brown 40 28 49 21 16 16 170 7.23%
BEAR 21 13 22 11 16 18 101 4.30%
Hambrecht 32 19 33 18 22 25 149 6.34%
Montgomery 30 16 29 17 21 22 135 5.74%
Robertson Stephen 15 17 36 17 17 18 120 5.10%
Salomon Brothers 18 5 8 11 12 10 64 2.72%
Smith Barney 19 7 17 7 11 11 72 3.06%
Salomon-Smith 11 1 8 8 7 12 47 2.00%
J. P. Morgan 5 5 12 3 3 7 35 1.49%
Prudential Securities 11 7 17 6 11 10 62 2.64%
FBC 12 7 9 4 6 5 43 1.83%
PaineWebber 14 8 14 9 8 4 57 2.42%
Boston-Brothers 10 0 11 4 5 18 48 2.04%
Total 480 240 573 295 339 424 2351 100.00%
Percentage 20.42% 10.21% 24.37% 12.55% 14.42% 18.03% 100.00%
Auditors
Frequency Table of Big 6 Auditors and Top 20 Underwriters
TABLE 6
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Panel A: Underpricing (Underwriting fee) Model
Variables UNDER UnFee 1/Offer PROC RETAIN STDDEV AUDSHR UNDSHR AUDIFF UNDIFF HITECH FOREIGN RELAYR
UNDER 1.00
UNFEE 0.187* 1.000
1/OFFER (0.279)* (0.489)* 1.000
PROC .153* 0.947* (0.426)* 1.000
RETAIN (0.032) 0.017 (0.010) 0.023 1.000
STDDEV 0.306* 0.045* 0.141* 0.009 (0.036) 1.000
AUDSHR 0.105* 0.111* (0.075)* 0.010* (0.260) 0.120* 1.000
UNDSHR 0.021 0.263* (0.276)* 0.246* (0.200) (0.188)* 0.084* 1.000
AUDIFF (0.017) 0.006 (0.102)* 0.002 (0.006) (0.061)* 0.495* 0.134* 1.000
UNDIFF (0.031) 0.110* (0.015) 0.104* 0.000 (0.109)* 0.041 0.659* 0.094* 1.000
HITECH .199* 0.064* (0.018) 0.047* (0.009) 0.357* (0.016) (0.263)* (0.124)* (0.105)* 1.000
FOREIGN (0.050)* 0.015 (0.016) 0.059* (0.093)* (0.045)* (0.017) 0.001 (0.033) 0.016 0.042 1.000
RELAYR 0.304* 0.273* (0.101) 0.210* (0.054)* 0.556* (0.162)* (0.081)* (0.035) (0.048)* .255* 0.015 1.000
UNDER =
UNFEE = underwriting fee as a percentage of IPO issue proceeds;
1/OFFER = the reciprocal of the offer price;
PROC = log of IPO issue proceeds;
RETAIN = the percentage of ownership retained by pre-IPO shareholders;
STDDEV = standard deviation of stock returns one year after IPO;
AUDSHR = % of two-digit SIC COMPUSTAT square root of assets audited for the year; 
UNDSHR = % of two-digit SIC Security Data Company (SDC) square root of proceeds underwritten for the year; 
AUDIFF =
UNDIFF =
HITECH = indicator variable if the  IPO is in the High Tech industry, and 0 otherwise;
FOREIGN = indicator variable equals to 1 if the IPO is a foreign company, and 0 otherwise; and
RELAYR = a categorical variable for year 1992 to 2001 as compared to year 1991.
indicator variable equals to 1 if the market share spread between the IPO firm’s underwriter and the next highest ranking underwriter in the IPO firm’s 
two-digit industry is at least ten percentage points, and 0 otherwise; 
indicator variable equals to 1 if the market share spread between the IPO firm’s audit firm and the next highest ranking audit firm in the IPO firm’s two-
digit industry is at least ten percentage points, and 0 otherwise;
TABLE 7 
Pearson's Correlation of Variables in the Regression Models
Variable Definitions:
log of the sum of one and the market adjusted first-day initial return;
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Variable ACCTFEE ASSETS PROC INVREC DEBT STDDEV TOP5 AUDSHR AUDIFF RELAYR
ACCTFEE 1.000 
ASSETS 0.289* 1.000
PROC 0.413* 0.647* 1.000
INVREC 0.093* (0.011) (0.081)* 1.000
DEBT 0.018 (.138)* (0.018) (0.014) 1.000
STDDEV 0.123 0.371 (0.113) (0.179)* 0.018 1.000
TOP5 (0.006) (0.059)* 0.002 (0.045)* (0.034)* 0.353* 1.000
AUDSHR 0.117* 0.069* 0.082* (0.058)* (0.011) 0.094* (0.061)* 1.000
AUDIFF 0.093 0.107* 0.079* (0.022) (0.007) 0.110* 0.525* 0.527* 1.000
RELAYR 0.410* (0.003) 0.092* (0.243)* (0.017) 0.551* 0.156* (0.018) (0.009) 1.000
ACCTFEE = log of the fees paid to the accounting firm associated with the IPO;
ASSETS = log of firm total assets;
PROC = log of IPO issue proceeds:
INVREC = (inventory + accounts receivable) / assets;
DEBT = total assets/total liabilities;
STDDEV = standard deviation of stock returns one year after IPO;
TOP5 =
AUDSHR = % of two-digit SIC COMPUSTAT square root of assets audited for the year; 
AUDIFF =
RELAYR = a categorical variable for year 1992 to 2001 as compared to year 1991.
* Indicates significance at the 5 percent level based on a two-tailed test. 
TABLE 7 (continued)
Panel B: Audit Fee Model 
Viable definitions:
indicator variable equals to 1 if the market share spread between the IPO firm’s audit firm and the next highest ranking audit firm in the IPO 
firm’s two-digit industry is at least ten percentage points, and 0 otherwise; and
indicator variable equals to 1 if industry accounts for > 5 percent of total sample IPOs (two digit SIC of 28, 35, 36, 38, 48, or 73), and 0 
otherwise;
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 Variablesa
Expected 
Sign Model 1a (replication)
Model 1b (with auditor and 
underwriter differentiation 
only)
Model 1c (with auditor and 
underwriter interaction)
Intercept ? 0.285 (1.89**) 0.362 (2.39**) 0.415 (2.65*)
RETAIN + -0.063 (1.94**) 0.059 (1.64***) -0.052 (1.48)
1/OFFER ? -1.856 (9.89*) -2.200 (11.70*) -2.184 (11.69)
PROC - -0.004 (0.49) -0.009 (1.10) -0.014 (1.67***)
STDDEV + 2.858 (10.42*) 2.260 (7.35*) 2.229 (7.27*)
FOREIGN ? -0.065 (3.04*) -0.066 (3.06*)
HITECH + 0.040 (4.41*) 0.046 (4.81*)
UNREP1 - 0.061 (2.85*)
UNREP2 - 0.034 (2.47*)
UNREP3 - -0.017 (1.78***)
BIG6 - -0.026 (2.04**)
UNDSHR ? 0.135 (1.23)
AUDSHR ? 0.141 (1.57)
UNDIFF - -0.012 (0.68) -0.060 (1.98**)
AUDIFF - -0.014 (0.73) -0.050 (1.94***)
UNSHR*AUDSHR ? 0.058 (0.1)
UNDIFF*AUDIFF ? 0.008 (0.14)
RELAYR ? 0.008 (3.99) 0.007 (3.99)
Adjusted R2 0.16 0.21 0.21
TABLE 8 
Panel A: OLS Regression of Underpricing on Auditor and Underwriter Industry Specialization/Differentiation, and Control Variables 
for All IPOs 
Regression Results of the Underpricing Model (p-values in parentheses)
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 Variablesa
Expected 
Sign
Model 2 (OLS for Firms with 
Big 4/5/6 auditors)
Model 3 (2SLS for Firms with 
Big 4/5/6 auditors)
Intercept ? 0.413 (2.64*) 0.415 (2.64*)
RETAIN + -0.052 (1.50*) -0.052 (1.47*)
1/OFFER ? -2.182 (11.69*) -2.119 (11.70*)
PROC - -0.014 (1.67***) -0.015 (1.68***)
STDDEV + 2.230 (7.28*) 2.223 (7.26*)
FOREIGN ? -0.066 (3.06*) -0.066 (3.06*)
HITECH + 0.046(4.82*) 0.045 (4.80*)
UNDSHR ? 0.146 (2.10**) 0.145 (2.08**)
AUDSHR ? 0.147 (2.18**) 0.153 (2.25**)
UNDIFF - -0.059 (2.02**) -0.059 (2.02**)
AUDIFF - -0.050 (1.99**) -0.057 (2.21**)
RELAYR ? 0.008 (4.02*) 0.008 (4.02*)
Adjusted R2 0.21 0.21
TABLE 8 (continued)
Panel B: Comparison of OLS and 2SLS Regression of Underpricing on Auditor and Underwriter Industry 
Specialization/Differentiation without Interaction
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Variablesa
Expected 
Sign
Regression without Retained 
Ownership
Regression with Retained  
Ownership
Intercept ? 0.837 (7.43*) 0.461 (2.59*)
RETAIN + -0.057 (2.29**) -0.059 (2.36**)
1/OFFER ? -3.106 (19.54*) -2.389 (12.02*)
PROC - -0.039 (6.57*) -0.017 (1.73**)
STDDEV + 3.417 (14.19*) 2.475 (8.95*)
FOREIGN ? -0.056 (3.32*) -0.061 (2.58*)
HITECH + 0.055 (6.00*) 0.051 (5,12*)
UNDSHR ? 0.190 (2.95*) 0.156 (2.00**)
AUDSHR ? 0.214 (3.12*) 0.166 (2.11**)
UNDIFF - -0.080 (2.93*) -0.066 (1.73***)
AUDIFF - -0.061 (2.12**) -0.050 (1.46)
RELAYR ? 0.010 (5.20*) 0.010 (3.98*)
AUDSWITCH - -0.080 (2.93**) -0.077 (1.83***)
Adjusted R2 0.30 0.23
a Panel A of Table 7 describes variables except for: 
BIG 6 = indicator variables equals to 1 if the audit firm is a Big4/5/6 auditor, and 0 otherwise;
UNREP1 =
UNREP2 (3) =
* = indicates multiplication; and
AUDSWITCH = indicator variables equals to 1 if the IPO firm switch to a industry specialist or differentiated 
auditor the year before IPO, and 0 otherwise. 
              test  as appropriate.  
TABLE 8 (continued)
Panel C: OLS Regression of Underpricing on Auditor and Underwriter Industry Specialization/Differentiation, and 
Auditor Switch for All IPOs 
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively, based on a one- or two-tailed  
indicator variable equals to 1 if the underwriter has a market share of 10 percent or more rated 
by the investment Dealer's Digest (IDD) per IPO year, and 0 otherwise; 
indicator variable equals to 1 if the underwriter’s market share is between 5 (1) percent and of 
10 (5) percent or more rated by the investment Dealer's Digest (IDD) per IPO year, and 0 
otherwise;
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Variablesa Expected sign OLS 2SLS
Intercept ? 7.167 (19.03*) 7.163 (19.03*)
ASSETS + 0.039 (3.03*) 0.038 (3.01*)
PROCEEDS + 0.253 (10.85*) 0.254 (10.90*)
INVREC + 0.172 (3.13*) 0.169 (3.09*)
DEBT + 0.032 (1.97**) 0.031 (1.92***)
STDDEV + 1.918 (2.21**) 1.987 (**)
TOP5
AUDSHR - -0.372 (1.56) -0.435 (1.81***)
AUDIFF + 0.289 (2.72*) 0.36 (3.21*)
RELAYR ? 0.086 (11.67*) 0.086 (11.62*)
Adjusted R2 0.25 0.25
aPanel B of Table 7 describes variables. 
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively, based 
             on a one- or two-  tailed test as appropriate.
TABLE 9
Regression of Audit Fee on Auditor Industry Specialization/Differentiation, and Control Variables 
for All IPOs (p-values in parentheses)
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Variablesa
Expected 
sign Overall sample Large IPOs Small IPOs
Intercept ? 3.119 (15.15*) 3.555 (17.44*) 2.581 (5.97*)
STDDEV + 0.408 (1.30) 0.778 (2.16**) 0.096 (0.18)
PROC - -0.103 (9.10*) -0.121 (11.00*) -0.078 (3.22*)
1/OFFER + 2.548 (10.96*) 1.035 (3.57*) 3.429 (8.75*)
RETAIN + -0.017 (0.58) -0.031 (1.37) 0.097 (1.14)
UNDSHR + -0.001 (0.01) -0.136 (1.65***) 0.348 (1.43***)
UNDIFF + -0.017 (0.40) 0.023 (0.60) -0.172 (1.43)
AUDIFF - -0.010 (0.30) 0.017 (0.55) -0.092 (1.21)
RELAYR ? -0.007 (2.33*) -0.004 (1.38) -0.009 (1.90***)
Adjusted R2 0.31 0.29 0.29
aPanel A of Table 7 describes variables. 
TABLE 10
Regression of Underwriting Fee on Auditor and Underwriter Industry Specialization/Differentiation, 
and Control Variables for All IPOs (p-values in parentheses)
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively, based  
            on a one- or two-tailed test as appropriate.
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Variablesa
Expected 
Sign
Operating 
performance 
(ROA ) measured 
from 0 to +1
Operating 
performance 
(ROA) measured 
from 0 to +2
Operating 
performance 
(ROA) 
measured from 
0 to +3
Average 
Operating 
performance 
(ROA) of +1, 
+2, +3 relative 
Intercept ? -0.044 (3.67*) -0.069 (3.22*) -0.129 (4.67*) 0.055 (1.03)
MUNDER ? 0.007 (1.070 0.012 (1.01) -0.006 (0.36) -0.075 (2.50*)
MRETAIN ? -0.008 (1.24) -0.005 (0.43) 0.019 (1.24) -0.088 (2.94*)
UNDSHR + 0.133 (2.58*) 0.116 (1.26) 0.218 (1.83***) -0.146 (0.64)
AUDSHR + -0.020 (0.34) -0.042 (040) 0.055 (0.41) 0.097 (0.38)
UNDIFF + -0.024 (0.87) 0.014 (0.29) -0.008 (0.12) 0.085 (0.70)
AUDIFF + 0.009 (0.35) 0.023 (0.50) 0.018 (0.31) 0.003 (0.03)
Adjusted R2 0.005 0.0002 0.0002 0.007
aPanel A of Table 7 describes variables except for: 
MUNDER =
MRETAIN =
TABLE 11
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively, based on a one- or two-
indicator variable equals to 1 if the underpricing is greater than the median underwriting, and 0 
otherwise;
indicator variable equals to 1 if the retained ownership is greater than the median value, and 0 
otherwise.
Regression of IPO Long-term Performance (Return on Assets) on Auditor and Underwriter Industry 
Specialization/Differentiation, and Control Variables for All IPOs (p-values in parentheses)
            tailed test as appropriate.  
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